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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
On Managerial Succession. (May 2006) 
Gregory Cash Hill, B.S., Idaho State University; 
M.P.A., Idaho State University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
This dissertation is an exploration, development and application of a theory on 
the effects of managerial succession on organizational performance in the public sector.  
Public management is a field of study within public administration that is gaining 
momentum and is strengthening both its theoretical and empirical bases.  In this 
dissertation I build upon the very small literature on managerial (or executive) 
succession to develop a theory of the effects of managerial succession on performance. I 
posit that in the short-term performance will decrease; however, over time organizations 
that have had a succession event will see an increase in performance. I employ the use of 
three unique datasets: Texas school district superintendents, British local education 
authorities, and Major League Baseball field managers.  All datasets have particular 
strengths that allow for a more complete empirical analysis.  What we find is that, while 
there appears to be no significant relationship between managerial succession and 
performance in the year following the succession event, there is a positive and 
significant event over time. Furthermore, in the British analysis, which is designed to 
test a similar organization to the Texas analysis yet in a vastly different organizational 
structure, we find no significant relationship between performance and succession. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Public management scholarship has recently seen a significant increase in 
theoretical and empirical exploration.  Ten years ago, public management as a field of 
theoretical study was in a state of disarray (Bozeman 1993).  It was thought to be simply 
the art of policy implementation and had seemingly no theoretical direction.  However, 
since 1993, public administration scholars have made significant strides in justifying 
public management as a legitimate field of theoretical study and, indeed, one of the 
fields of public administration that is rapidly on the rise.   
Public administration has numerous theoretical puzzles to solve. One of these 
puzzles is the role of changing managers in an organization. We see that, in practice, it is 
a phenomenon that occurs frequently, either voluntarily or involuntarily, but what impact 
does it have on public organizations?  What effect does changing managers have on 
organizational performance?  What are the potential outcomes of managerial change, 
and do organizations even care?  Are we convinced that managers matter at all, or are 
they simply interchangeable organizational pieces, doing nothing more than monitoring 
subordinates as they perform their standard operating procedures? To answer these 
questions, we need to start with a look at the organizations. Data published by public 
organizations show great variation in performance, suggesting that some organizations  
 
 
_______________ 
This dissertation follows the style of The Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 
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perform better than others, some worse than others.  How much of this variation in  
performance is attributable to management change? In this dissertation, I will look at 
what we know (the little that we do) and what we can develop with regards to 
managerial succession and the effects of changing managers in an organization. 
The influence of public managers on organizational performance has long been 
of interest in the field of public administration (Barnard 1939, Brudney, O’Toole, and 
Rainey 2000, Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004, Rainey 2003).  Recently, rigorous 
empirical, quantitative approaches started to permeate public administration scholarship.  
For example, studies now exist examining the influence of performance on networks 
(O’Toole and Meier 1999, Provan and Milward 1995, Milward and Provan 1998), 
strategy (Boyne and Walker 2004), and governance (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001).  
Despite the recent surge in quantification of public management, one area of public 
management research that has not been explored is the extent to which organizational 
performance is affected when management is changed. Examining the effect of 
managerial succession on organizational performance from a large-N perspective will 
assist in building public management scholarship by allowing for more generalizability 
and not relying so much on the context of individual circumstances. The primary goal of 
this dissertation is to address the puzzle of managerial succession and its effect on 
organizational performance. 
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Dissertation Focus 
This dissertation investigates the impact managerial succession has on the 
performance of public organizations.  Specifically, three empirical questions will be 
addressed:  how does managerial succession affect organizational performance in 
general?  What is the short-term impact of managerial succession, and what is the long-
term effect of succession on performance?  These three questions lead to a number of 
ancillary questions, such as, how does frequency of turnover influence performance, 
what are some of the moderating effects that buffer against the effects of change, how 
does organizational structure affect the influence of the manager on performance, and 
how does managerial change affect other aspects of public management, such as, 
networking with the community?   
 
Significance of Research 
Determining the impact of managerial succession on organizational performance 
has both theoretical contributions to public administration scholarship as well as a 
normative contribution to public administrators.  First, a theory of public managerial 
succession will aid in addressing the questions of managers’ influence on the 
organization generally and performance specifically.  If managers do, indeed, matter 
then managerial succession should be reflected in performance indicators for the 
organization.  
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Managers matter in terms of performance for three main reasons. First, managers 
are able to establish and utilize political networks. O’Toole and Meier (1999) argue that 
networks are the link to managing the environment. Through establishing and managing 
networks, managers are better able to “manage.” In terms of managing the network, they 
argue that, “Management can either adopt a strategy of buffering the environment or 
actively seek to exploit the environment for the benefit of the program system (1999, 
517).” These networks function both as a tool for exploitation and a buffer for absorbing 
political pressure. Managers can act to exploit the network by engaging network actors 
to reduce the manager’s costs.  It is clear that recent trends in public sector service 
provision show movement toward privatization, contracting out, and “reinventing 
government.”1 As these trends gain momentum, networks and network management 
increase in importance (O’Toole 1997).   
Second, managers can provide clear goals and objectives, providing 
accountability to political principals and the citizenry as well as stability to the 
organization.  Rainey (1997, 205) defines goals and objectives.  First, “a goal is a future 
state that one strives to achieve, and an objective is a more specific, short-term goal, a 
step toward a more general, long-term goal.”2  If managers can provide and implement 
                                                          
1 Osborne and Gaebler (1992) stimulated and propagated the notion of contracting out in their book, 
“Reinventing Government.”  While it has proved to be a best-seller and is considered a must-read by many 
in public services, it does not provide conclusive evidence that contracting out of public service provision 
is more effective than traditional service provision. 
2 Rainey (1997) provides an exhaustive treatment on the theoretical expectation of goals in public 
management theory.  Much of this work is built upon theories of motivation (see Evans 1986). One of the 
best articulated theories of goals is the “The Path-Goal Theory of Leadership,” which argues that effective 
leaders motivate and inspire subordinates by helping them pursue certain goals that influence performance.  
Management By Objective (Morrisey, 1976), or MBO, is another proposition of goal management in the 
public sector.   
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goals, particularly performance-oriented goals, then they can be influential in outcomes 
of the organization as well as held accountable to their political principals. It is 
reasonable to assume, then, that clear goals provided and implemented by management 
would influence organizational performance (Pinder, 1984; Locke and Latham, 1990). 
From an empirical perspective, Locke and Lathan (1990 and 2002) from the field of 
psychology  find evidence in support of their theory of goal setting, which states that 
specific goals lead to higher performance,  and Chun and Rainey (2005) find evidence to 
suggest that the relationship between goal ambiguity and organizational performance is 
negative.   
 Finally, managers have the ability to change the next subordinate level of 
management, which allows them to establish management teams.  Management teams 
are instrumental in providing efficient and possibly effective organizational 
performance, as they are made up of like-minded individuals with intentions that are 
likely to mirror the top manager.  If the top manager is able to choose a management 
team to reflect his or her values, then he or she is likely to influence performance.  As 
important as organizational structure is, without managers to establish networks, goals, 
and preserve institutional memory, the implementation of political directives would be 
challenging, indeed. 
A second reason to design and test this theory is that the determinants of 
management performance in the public sector are just beginning to bloom, and as such, 
managerial succession ought to play a vital role. Thus, this analysis is not simply adding 
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a new variable to an existing body of literature, but helping to define the new and 
relatively unexplored impact of managerial succession and organizational performance. 
Third, the theory of managerial succession posited here adds to the growing 
literature on the theoretical and empirical study of public management, increasing the 
scholarly pursuit of knowledge in this under-studied region of public administration. As 
public administration continues to make its mark as a legitimate subfield of political 
science, public management theories have the potential to be bedrock of the field.  
One potential reason that very little scholarship on the determinants of 
performance in public organizations exists is that very few public organizations have 
consistent performance indicators that can be used in a large-N study.  Employing school 
districts as the operational unit of this foray into public management research is 
particularly useful as the districts have similar goals, are rich in data, and are relatively 
untapped.  One of the major obstacles in studying public management performance is the 
inconsistency of performance indicators across organizations.  Using school districts 
allows for the comparison of a great many organizations across similar performance 
indicators, yet with enough variation in structure, hierarchy, and goals to test hypotheses.  
The diversity in size, structure, and makeup of school districts, not only in Texas but in 
the United Kingdom as well, provide a rich field of study and research. 
The normative implications are important, as well.  A study of managerial 
succession can provide practical knowledge and guidance for public managers and 
organizations in general, particularly of organizational behavior and decision-making in 
terms of performance.  It offers organizations a framework for making managerial 
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decisions. Finally, this study is designed to assist in solidifying the study of public 
management as a scientific endeavor, not simply as the art of policy implementation.  
Through these analyses I can show that indeed, management and performance can be 
approached from a quantitative, social-science perspective.3 
 
Historical Perspective 
The history of public management as a vocation is long, indeed.  It made its 
emergence into the academic community with two well-known figures; Woodrow 
Wilson and Frank Goodnow.4  
In 1887, Woodrow Wilson, who is most recognized in the field of public 
administration for his introduction of the politics/administration dichotomy, also 
provided the theoretical base for the rationale of public management.  He said, “It is the 
object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and 
successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost 
possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy” (1887,  
197). He continues,   “Administration is the most obvious part of government; it is 
government in action; it is the executive, the operative, the most visible side of 
                                                          
3 There is a body of literature that employs a qualitative approach to public management, implying that 
managing public organizations is an art rather than a science. One of its most vocal disciples is Robert 
Behn.  His body of work is heavily cited in practical public administration as well as in MPA programs. 
4 Wilson would, of course, go on to become the 28th President of the United States, and Frank Goodnow 
would become the first president of the American Political Science Association.  The chronology is 
important here, as Wilson’s work was written and ignored for much of the first half of the 20th century, yet 
Goodnow’s contribution, which surfaced in 1900, was immediately recognized as a foundation for the 
academic pursuit of public administration and the politics/administration dichotomy. 
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government, and is of course as old as government itself” (1887, 198). Implicit in 
Wilson’s view of government is the need for government workers who would be 
responsive to the democratically elected officials and at the same time, oversee the 
effective interpretation and implementation of public policy.  Thus is born Wilson’s 
public manager. 
Goodnow, in 1900, argues that there are two distinct functions of government, 
namely, politics and administration. “Politics has to do with policies or expressions of 
the state will.  Administration has to do with the execution of these policies” (Goodnow 
1900 [1967], 18).  Indeed, Goodnow makes clear in his discussion that politics is the 
process of articulating, guiding and influencing public policies, while administration is 
the implementation of those policies.5   
During this period when Wilson and Goodnow were defining public 
administration, Frederick Taylor (1911) was independently conducting experiments that 
would shape the study of administration to this day.  Taylor pioneered the concept of 
scientific management, which is, “the principal object of management should be to 
secure the maximum prosperity for the employer, coupled with the maximum prosperity 
of the employe[e]” (1911 [1998], 1).  The concept is that by discovering the best way to 
accomplish a task (and by “best” Taylor means the most efficient and highest class of 
work (1998, 4)) both the employer and the employee recognize the maximum benefits. 
In other words, the most efficient process will yield the most prosperous results.  
                                                          
5 Both Wilson and Goodnow, in describing the politics/administration dichotomy, were describing an 
“ideal” administration as opposed to an empirical reality. 
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Premised on the notion of “one-best-way,” scientific management was eagerly adopted 
by scholars of public administration. Eventually scientific management led to the 
foundation of classical organization theory, assuming that if there was one best way to 
accomplish a production task, then it follows that there must be one best way to 
accomplish social organization and tasks (Shafritz and Hyde, 1997).  Taylor identified 
four (4) duties of management.  They are:  
1. replacing traditional rule-of-thumb methods of work accomplishment 
with systematic, more scientific methods of measuring and managing 
individual work elements; 
2. studying scientifically the selection and sequential development of 
workers to ensure optimal placement of workers into work roles; 
3. obtaining the cooperation of workers to ensure full application of 
scientific principles, and; 
4. establishing logical divisions within work roles and responsibilities 
between workers and management.6 
Current public management is profoundly impacted by Taylor’s notion of scientific 
management. Indeed, precise measurement of process and outcomes, the scientific 
selection of workers, and cooperation of workers to achieve organizational goals can be  
                                                          
6 The list above was derived from testimony by Frederick Taylor to the Committee of the House of 
Representatives to Investigate the Taylor and Other Systems of Shop Management.  Interestingly, the term 
“scientific management” is credited to Louis Brandeis who was attempting to convince the Interstate 
Commerce Commission that it was wasting “a million dollars a day” by not having a systematic, scientific 
method of management on the railroads. The list was compiled in the form above by Shafritz and Hyde 
(1997). 
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found to pervade public management. In reference to scientific management and its 
relationship to public management scholarship, Frederickson and Smith (2003, 99) say, 
“As business innovations often do, these concepts soon colonized government.  They 
became a central part of the progressive era and the movement to reform government, 
and they were highly influential in the development of civil service systems in 
government at all levels.” We see that many contemporary theories (including the one 
posited in this dissertation) of public management stem from the premise of scientific 
management (Frederickson and Smith 2003).  One of the scholars influenced by 
scientific management was Luther Gulick. 
In 1937, Luther Gulick laid out seven responsibilities of public administrators.  
They were: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and 
budgeting.  These seven responsibilities, commonly referred to by the acronym 
POSDCORB, were the functioning orthodoxy of the scientific management movement 
and established the modern concept of the roles and responsibilities of public 
administrators as managers. As Leonard White argued, public administration is “the 
management of men and materials in the accomplishment of the purposes of the 
state…In every direction good administration seeks the elimination of waste, the 
conservation of material and energy, and the most rapid and complete achievement of 
public purposes consistent with economy and the welfare of the employees” (1926 
[1937], 6-7). From the POSDCORB orthodoxy has evolved the modern notion of 
managerial responsibility couched in one form as organizational performance.   
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Another concept stemming from Gulick and the POSDCORB orthodoxy is span 
of control.  Span of control, simply put, is that as managerial oversight broadens to more 
subordinates, controlling and monitoring information and behavior becomes more 
difficult, and influence is spread thin.  Span of control is an essential faction of public 
management scholarship and will be addressed in great detail in chapter V of this 
dissertation. 
 
How We Got Here 
  Multiple academic “movements” have occurred since the 1930’s that have helped 
to define public management.  For example, in the late 1960’s, under the flag of “new 
public administration,” theories of democratic accountability, social equity, self-
management and flat hierarchies were reviving the management theories which were lost 
during the 1930’s and 1940’s. But academic interest in theories of public management 
waned until the 1980’s.  The 1980’s reinvigorated management scholarship; not in the 
terms of decision theory, but in terms of descriptive management behavior (Frederickson 
and Smith 2003), circumscribing, in a sense, management studies back to its theoretical 
roots. 
 The most recent movement in public administration scholarship is the 
governance movement, championed primarily by Laurence Lynn, Jr.  Governance 
advocates argue that this field of study seeks to determine how the public sector can 
continue to provide services across a broad range of arenas that satisfy the public good 
(Heinrich and Lynn, 2000; Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2001).  The management of those 
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who are charged with providing services to the public has a lot to do with the 
effectiveness of the provision of services.  This study is referred to as “governance.”  
Governance can be defined as; “regimes of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings, 
and practices that constrain, prescribe and enable government activity” (Lynn, Heinrich, 
and Hill 2001, 3) where “activity” is defined as the delivery of the goods and services 
the government is charged with providing. In order to deliver the goods and services, 
organizations are designed so that the onus of this delivery falls upon the managers.  
 
Organization 
  Chapter II develops the theory for this dissertation.  There are many factors that 
lead to organizational performance.  Some factors are beyond managerial control, for 
example, ethnic and racial makeup of the constituency, fiscal constraints, and economic 
conditions.  Other factors, such as leadership, networking, managerial skill, and 
managerial succession also affect organizational performance.  Managerial succession, 
as an influence on organizational performance, has largely been overlooked by 
management scholars, both in the public context as well as the private context.7  Chapter 
II will explicate a theory of managerial succession. 
The next three chapters develop the empirical examinations of the theory. Each 
empirical chapter begins with an explanation of how the succession theory will be tested.   
                                                          
7 The use of private sector management literature related to managerial succession is a valuable resource in 
the development of a theory of public managerial succession.  It is of particular interest because, as will be 
discussed further in the next chapter, there is very little work in the public management literature related to 
succession. 
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All three chapters explore a different wrinkle of the theory of managerial succession, and 
quite logically build upon each other. In all three chapters, I strive to provide evidence of 
the affect of managerial succession on organizational performance.  Utilizing three 
different datasets adds to the robustness and generalizability of the theory. 
In chapter III, I test the short and long-term impact of managerial succession on 
performance in the U.S. context.  Using data from high school districts in the state of 
Texas, I argue that succession events do, indeed, impact organizational performance.  
The empirical results compliment the theory and hypotheses, and provide the most 
comprehensive, first look at the influence of succession on performance. 
In chapter IV, I explore the impact of managerial succession on performance in a 
non-U.S. context, using data from British school districts.  Much of the traditional public 
management scholarship is centered in the United States and its rather decentralized 
system of government. Recently, however, a push for more collaborative international 
scholarship in public management has led to a systematic increase in the number of non-
U.S studies emerging.8 In this chapter, I not only test the model with the British data, but 
I also make an argument and test for the impact of organizational structure.  I argue that 
organizations with rigid hierarchies are less likely to feel the impact of a succession 
event than organizations with loose hierarchies. Most interestingly, the empirical results 
give us null findings, disallowing for an acceptance or rejection of the theory, but truly 
                                                          
8 Among these collaborative efforts was the “Determinants of Performance” conference held in Cardiff, 
Wales, May, 2004.  Much of that work can be accessed in the October 2005 edition of the Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory.  Other recent works are the Oxford Handbook of Public 
Management (Ferlie, Lynn, and Pollitt, 2005) and Governing Networks (Salminem, 2003). 
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implying that something other than the turnover event itself is driving performance 
decreases.  Is it structure? 
In chapter V, I test the frequency of managerial succession and its effect on 
performance.  In order to test these hypotheses, I employ data from 26 Major League 
Baseball (MLB) organizations over a 25 year period.  I argue that MLB field managers 
behave like, and function under, many of the same constraints as public managers, 
providing a reasonable proxy for public managers.  I find that indeed, managerial 
succession has a negative effect on organizational performance, and that, while some 
managerial change is healthy, excessive change causes performance to drop. 
Chapter VI provides the conclusions and summarizes the results.  I tie all three of 
the empirical chapters together and assess the adequacy of the empirical analysis of the 
theory.  I use the concluding chapter to evaluate my hypotheses, the success of my 
expectations, and possible explanations for why some hypotheses performed better than 
others. Finally, I make some comments to the significance of the research, both scientific 
contributions and normative contributions.   
Finally, a paragraph regarding the data and analyses; in order to address the 
hypotheses presented in the following chapter, I will employ three different datasets.   
The first dataset is from Texas school districts, the second dataset is comprised of school 
districts from the United Kingdom, specifically England, and the third dataset is 
comprised of Major League Baseball and its managers.  Each of these datasets will be 
discussed in length in their respective chapters, but I will say here that each are designed 
to empirically test the theory outlined.  The Texas data will test the short and long-term 
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effects, as well as networking and where the manager comes from.  The British data will 
attempt to mirror as many aspects of the Texas data tests as possible, given its 
limitations, but its primary significance is testing the theory in a wholly different 
organizational structure.  Finally the Major League Baseball data is principally designed 
to test the frequency hypothesis.  By employing three similar datasets, yet with 
individual strengths, I believe that we can produce a better examination of the theory of 
managerial succession.  
To test the hypotheses I will use traditional Ordinary Least Squares regression 
analysis with adjustments related to pooled time series datasets.  The analysis will 
employ a fixed effects model in the long-term tests in order to account for variation over 
time. This should help to ensure that any results are not the product of general trends or 
other unknown factors that are shifting the regression line over time. 
 
Summary 
 Public managers are the most visible, and arguably one of the most influential 
members of the organizational structure. They are more than just interchangeable parts 
of the organization. They are fundamental in the performance of the organization in a 
democratic system in that they receive direction from political principals and oversee the 
actions of bureaucratic subordinates.  Furthermore, they exercise judgment and 
discretion (for good or ill) in the implementation of vague and often contradictory 
legislative mandates. Indeed, they act as a conduit between policy formation and policy 
implementation, overseeing and influencing steps along the way.  
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 In this chapter, I have presented the background and basic framework of the 
theory of managerial succession, the relevance of the research, and the structure I will be 
using to solve the theoretical puzzles presented throughout the rest of the dissertation.   
What follows in this dissertation is the contribution of three points to the 
scholarly literature on public management.  First, I offer a theoretical argument on how 
managerial succession affects the performance of public organizations generally. 
Second, I test hypotheses using systematic methods and quantitative methodology.  
Third, I make normative and qualitative inferences; however, these inferences are based 
on the quantitative methodology. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A THEORY OF MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION 
 
The true test of good government is its aptitude 
 and tendency to produce good administration. 
Alexander Hamilton 
 
 
 
The literature on the succession of public managers is limited. A review of the 
literature on managerial succession, both public and private, leads us to argue that public 
managerial succession studies are vitally important in understanding the role of public 
managers. 
 
Studying the Private Sector 
 
The vast majority of succession literature focuses on private sector managers, 
which differ substantially from public sector managers. Indeed, many private sector 
management scholars argue that CEO succession is the perhaps one of the most 
significant events to occur within the firm (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Kesner and 
Sebora, 1994). The role of the CEO is vital to the firm. Zhang and Rajagopalan argue 
that “CEO succession is perhaps one of the most crucial events in the life of any firm 
because of the substantive and symbolic importance of the CEO position” (2004, 483).  
Does the public sector view the symbolic importance of the public manager like the 
private sector does the CEO?  On the contrary, the oft-stereotyped reputation of public 
managers is as unmotivated self-maximizing bureaucrats, quite the opposite of the 
private sector CEO, who is central, not only in visibility, but to the success of the firm. 
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The importance of private sector managers can hardly be disputed.  Kenneth Andrews 
(1980) explicates the role of the private sector manager.  He argues that the firm (and its 
manager) should strive to make “an economic and noneconomic contribution…to its 
shareholders, employees, customers, and communities” (1980, 18). Clearly, then, with 
this mark of importance attached to the chief executive, CEOs are the individuals 
responsible and accountable to investors, stakeholders and clients.  Changing CEOs 
should, then, greatly impact the performance of the organization (Brady and Helmich, 
1984; Dalton and Kesner, 1985; Glover, 1976; Hofer, 1980; Steiner, 1979; Steiner, 
Miner, and Gray, 1982).9 
Many of the differences between public and private sector management are 
presented in terms of the means available to the managers. In other words, what 
resources are available to the manager that allows him or her to influence performance?  
The CEO, as a rule, has tremendous autonomy in the decision-making process, and is at 
liberty to employ whatever methods deemed necessary to accomplish the goal.  Private 
sector chief executives are often held accountable to boards of directors (and indirectly, 
to stakeholders) to accomplish their goals, which are almost exclusively monetarily  
based.  Without fail, we find that in studies of the private sector, virtually all  
                                                          
9 The theory of management and its impact on performance is contradicted by the work of Herbert 
Kaufman and his population ecology theory.  Population ecology, borrowed from a prominent theory in 
the natural sciences, argues that organizations are open systems that are capable of replenishing 
themselves from the environment.  However, as environments change, organizations fail to adapt and 
eventually their inability to extract resources from the new environment kills them.  Kaufman (1985) 
argues that survival is essentially random, and that management strategies are fallacies. Kaufman’s 
population ecology has been met with some resistance.  Delacroix (1987) argues that Kaufman’s portrayal 
of randomness is rather extreme, and that “few population ecologists would feel comfortable with his 
literal concept of chance as an utterly unpatterned lottery-like culling of extant organizations” (1987,612). 
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performance indicators are related to a monetary goal. There is very little mention, if 
any, of goals other than monetary-based. Public sector managers do not enjoy this 
luxury.  As a rule, managers in the public sector are not at liberty to set their own 
performance goals. Nor do they have ultimate control over funds to accomplish those 
goals. The overseeing body, normally the legislature, sets goals and nearly always 
controls the budget. 
Another significant challenge in studying public management is the difficulty in 
establishing well defined performance indicators.  While the private sector has a tangible 
monetary indicator (i.e. the bottom line), the public sector’s gauge is legislatively 
mandated goals, which are a vague and often contradictory barometer. In other words, 
public managers must function within a state-mandated budget to accomplish 
legislatively-mandated goals. Public bureaucracies and managers also must recognize 
and espouse such democratic ideals as accountability, efficiency, responsive, and equity, 
all which are vital to public organizations but are often in contradiction with one another. 
Indeed, governments are established to provide corrections for “market failures,” or 
goods and services that a purely economic community could not support or chose not to 
provide.   
There are a handful of public and private sector studies dealing with managerial 
change. Yukl (2002) argues that managerial succession studies are necessary in order to 
determine the effect of top-level leadership change on organizational performance. His 
argument is that these studies are generally very difficult to do and most existing studies 
are not empirically reliable in terms of drawing substantive, theoretical conclusions.  
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Goodman (1982) views managerial change as elusive, something that cannot be clearly 
or accurately tested.  O’Toole and Meier (2003) look at organizational stability, but do 
not explicitly address the impacts of managerial change.  They find that organizational 
stability leads to more efficient functioning.  The research questions in this analysis are 
not expressly addressed in any of these bodies of literature. 
Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) provide a more complete analysis of managerial 
succession.  They argue that there are three competing theories that account for the 
occurrence of managerial change: the adaptive view, the inertial view, and the 
contingency view.  The adaptive view is that organizations will adapt if the performance 
levels are not met by recruiting from outside the organization.  “When performance is 
poor, directors will favor outside candidates, because outsiders are perceived to be more 
capable of changing the mission, objectives, and strategy of an organization than are 
insiders” (1993, 764). Furthermore, during times of good performance, an insider would 
be less disruptive to the overall regime.  Thus, the adaptive view is rationally intuitive. 
Cannella and Lubatkin also propose the inertial or scapegoating view, which is, 
that organizations are so resistant to change that they will likely hire from inside the 
organization even if performance is poor.  The firm can then cast blame onto the 
individual manager, not the regime, and hire from within, which is safer and still 
promotes the firm’s regime.  These assumptions are drawn mostly from the early 
attempts to explain management through baseball field managers (Grusky 1963; Gamson 
and Scotch 1964).  
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Finally, Cannella and Lubatkin posit a contingency view of change, claiming that 
sociopolitical factors moderate and drive succession.  This contingency model of change 
is drawn from Frederickson, Hambrick and Baumrin’s (1988) premise, “[T]he link 
between an organization’s performance and its directors’ decision to dismiss an 
incumbent CEO is not direct but rather is moderated by four constructs:  director 
expectation and attributions, director allegiances and values, the power of the incumbent 
CEO, and the availability of alternative candidates for the CEO position” (Cannella and 
Lubatkin 1993, 766).  These four “constructs,” or constraints, should all be factors in 
measuring the effect of managerial succession.10  Although the authors do not consider 
the availability of an alternative CEO because of lack of data, they do explicate how 
their remaining constructs are moderating influences in director decisions to dismiss 
incumbents.   
Cannella and Lubatkin argue that directors may have feelings of allegiance 
toward the CEO, particularly if the director originally appointed him or her.  Tight 
allegiances will make directors less critical of CEOs and their performance, influencing 
the decision of outsider versus insider hire.  Furthermore, if the CEO has power and 
influence, it is likely that an heir apparent, or insider, will be hired as it is a signal to the 
shareholders that the CEO is performing well and performing one of his key 
responsibilities, namely grooming an heir (Vancil, 1987).  Cannella and Lubatkin 
present a well-articulated model of factors that lead to managerial succession, upon 
                                                          
10 Other proponents of the contingency view, or sociopolitical approach to managerial change, are 
Goodstein and Boeker 1991; Miller, 1991; Morck et al., 1989; Puffer and Weintrop, 1991; Sonnenfeld, 
1988; Vancil, 1987; Walsh and Seward, 1990. See Cannella and Lubatkin for citations. 
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which this theory relies to predict the effect of insider versus outsider succession on 
organizational performance. 
Other private sector studies have looked at different conditions that affect 
organizational performance.  Lieberson and O’Connor (1972) find that the industry and 
the company account for more variance than the leader or manager, except in terms of 
profit margin.  By using performance indicators such as sales, earnings and profit 
margins as well as managerial succession, Lieberson and O’Connor show that 
environmental factors, the organization’s place within the industry, as well as the 
industry itself, have a greater affect on performance than does leadership.11   
Some past studies have been conducted in terms of leadership and seem to 
contradict Lieberson and O’Connor’s findings. Weiner and Mahoney (1981) examined 
large manufacturing companies (net assets of at least $16 million) and found that 
leadership accounted for 44% of the variance in profit.  Leadership was measured in 
three ways: stewardship, capital structure strategy, and retained earnings strategy.  
Others have found similar effects of leadership. For example, Thomas (1988) looked at 
retail and found that leadership explained 51% of the profit variance. These are 
interesting studies and provide the framework for looking at change in leadership.  If 
leaders or managers make up such a substantial portion of the variance in performance 
indicators, then changing those leaders ought to have an effect on this variance. 
The only work directly related to public managerial succession and  
                                                          
11 This is a significant finding and one that reinforces a contrary theory of management, namely, that the 
system is what is driving the results, not the managers.  This issue will be addressed in chapter V. 
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organizational performance is Boyne and Dahya (2002), which argues that managerial 
succession has an impact on organizational performance, but that impact is mitigated by 
three conditions: the means, motives, and opportunities of the replacement manager.  
The relationship they posit between performance, succession, and managerial conditions 
is hierarchical in nature, and they even go so far as to posit hypotheses, but do not 
provide any empirical justification for their claims. 
Clearly, with so little work on managerial succession, and almost no work on the 
effects of succession on organizational performance, the study of managerial succession 
presented in this dissertation is important in many ways.  
 
Short and Long-term Effects of Succession on Organizational Performance 
A theory of managerial succession can be crafted to increase our understanding 
of the role of public managers in the performance of the organization and to solve these 
political queries. The basis of the theory I propose stems from the article by Boyne and 
Dahya, but it is mainly in response to observations in the public sector of turnover in a 
supposedly stable bureaucracy and the intuitive implications associated with the turnover 
with respect to performance.  
In order to develop a theory of managerial succession and organizational 
performance, I start with some definitions.  First, a “succession event” is the process of 
filling the vacancy of a top managerial position with a manager new to that position.  
Thus, managerial succession is the implementation of a new manager into the 
organizational structure. 
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Second, in defining “organizational performance,” I rely on the definition posited 
by Boyne and Dahya (2002, 184), the “standards of service provision, as measured and 
judged by a powerful external constituency such as central government and its agents.”12  
If organizational performance is politically constructed, then measuring performance as 
outlined above is reasonable, indeed. 
We can argue based not only on intuitive rationalization but on the very small 
literature above, that managerial succession affects organizational performance. 
Furthermore, succession affects performance in two distinct ways:  first, the immediate 
effect of managerial succession on performance is negative, or the outcomes the year 
following a succession event will be negative.  Second, over time, the effect of a 
succession event will weaken as the replacement manager begins to rebuild hierarchical 
and network relations, driving performance in a positive direction.  
In order to trace out the logic of the argument, I have to make an assumption 
regarding the replacement manager.  The assumption is that on average, the organization 
replaces the old manager with a better manager.  I have no data to support this and it is 
unlikely that such data exist, but while there is tremendous uncertainty in the hiring 
process, the assumption is that the organization at least believes they are hiring a better 
manager than the one they left behind.  This is may not always be the case, such as in 
terms of voluntary replacements or retirements.  Then again, if we refer back to Cannella 
and Lubatkin and reference the grooming process that an heir apparent goes through 
                                                          
12 Defining these two components of the theory allow us to leave behind the quibbles over “what is 
performance in public organizations” or “can performance be defined?” which are arguments that abound 
in discussions of measuring public organizational performance.   
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with the incumbent, we might indeed argue that the organization is at best expecting a 
better manager, and at worst, expecting someone no worse than when they left.  This is 
an important assumption to the analysis. 
This theory leads to some non-intuitive conclusions.  The first of which is, if the 
short-term effect on performance is always negative, why would organizations ever 
change managers when short-term costs are so large? Aside from having no choice in the 
matter (the incumbent either retires or is lured away from the organization), there is little 
rationale for changing managers. 
We have no idea on the actual influence of the manager in terms of public 
organizational performance.  Why, then, would an organization not always choose the 
promotion path that leads to increased performance in both the short and long term?  In 
practice, organizations do not always choose this path.  Below are three scenarios that 
will likely assist in answering why certain managers are chosen over others. 
Scenario 1:  The political factors  
The organization may have some political need to choose a manager who is 
capable of large scale positive influence over short periods of time, at the 
expense of long-term performance. Thus, the organization may choose the short-
term candidate over the long-term candidate. 
Scenario 2:  Bureaucratic factors 
The organization may desire to redesign the long-term goals and mission, which 
would require an external hire, willing to sacrifice short-term performance for 
long-term success.   
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Scenario 3:  Reflective Speculation 
The vacancy may have come via some factor that is beyond the scope of control 
of the organization (retirement, death, and child-birth), at which point, the 
organization simply poses the following question—How were we doing vs. what 
are our options for replacement?   
The organization will then make a decision based on a boundedly rational cost-benefit 
analysis, weighing the goals, needs, and wants of the organization.  The decision of how 
to fill the vacancy is clouded in a shroud of uncertainty, to be sure, as the organization 
has a pool (probably quite shallow) of applicants to choose from, and only a vague idea 
of their skills. 
To explain managerial succession and the query above, I attempt to enter the fray 
at the point of managerial vacancy.  All things being equal, the organization has many 
things to consider when determining how to replace its manager.  Chief among these 
considerations is that it can either fill the vacancy with someone from inside the 
organizational structure or they can hire a replacement from the outside.  It must pick the 
manager from a pool of managers, having only a vague idea about their managerial 
skills, which casts a degree of uncertainty on the process. The transaction costs 
associated with an outside hire are going to be greater, as the new manager with little or 
no ties to the organization will have to establish political bridges with the governing 
board as well as in the community, build trust within the hierarchy, and must be 
sensitized to organizational culture and norms.  Part of the cultural training is the 
outsider candidate’s inability to recognize informal agreements and understandings that 
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exist between subordinates as well as between management and stakeholders (Cannella 
and Lubatkin 1993). The organization, in short, must make a decision based on the 
limited information they have about their managerial options, bounded by the outcome 
of their cost-benefit analysis. 
To minimize some of the uncertainty, there are conspicuous mitigating factors 
associated with the outcomes.  If the manager is chosen from inside the organization to 
fill the vacancy, we would expect to see little change in terms of performance.  The 
replacement manager’s transaction costs are low relative to the benefits he brings, 
making him an obvious choice to either maintain the status quo or see an increase in 
performance. Benefits include a working knowledge of the culture, a well-established 
network of external actors, and direct training from the previous manager (Zhang and 
Rajagopalan 2004). Indeed, an insider hire can be viewed as the heir to the throne, being 
afforded all of the rights and privileges that accompany that training.  The agency is 
clear on the potential of the heir and is able to adapt to his strengths and weaknesses. 
The status quo argument is the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis, having some 
concept of his skills and training (presumably these were established in-house) and by 
virtue of being entrenched in the organization, the costs of building bridges and political 
trust are essentially gone.  The increase in performance outcome is related to the “stale 
in the saddle” argument.  The benefit to an internal promotion may very well be an 
invigoration of ideas and innovation of implementation strategies, changing the direction 
of the performance, if ever so slightly.   In this case, the benefit-cost analysis would 
resemble this: 
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IIII CBCB −≥−  
Where: 
=IB Benefits associated with hiring from the inside 
=IC Costs associated with hiring from the inside 
=IB Benefits associated with hiring an outsider 
=IC Costs associated with hiring an outsider 
On the other hand, were the vacancy filled from an outside, albeit highly 
qualified, replacement, the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis would look quite 
different.  The cost associated with networking, building political trust and 
organizational capital, determining organizational norms and culture, as well as the 
personal costs of a change in lifestyle will be high relative to those of an insider.  The 
presumption then is that outside hires would cause a dip in performance.  Whether that 
performance dip persists over time is an empirical question, one which we would 
hypothesize is related to the relative benefits of the new outside hire. Clearly in this case, 
the cost-benefit figure above would see the “less than or equal to” sign reversed, 
implying that the decision calculus leans in the direction of an outside hire. 
There are four potential outcomes based upon the hiring decision in terms of 
organizational performance.  In the immediate future, the first potential outcome is an 
increase in performance. This is a logical and highly desirable outcome. Conversely, the 
second potential result may be negative performance in the immediate future.  In the 
long-run, performance can also result in positive performance (again, this scenario is 
highly desirable) while the fourth scenario would suggest a decrease in the long-term 
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outcomes.  Obviously, the organization wants to make the decision that will best 
maximize its utility, and to do so, it must make the decision under conditions of 
uncertainty.  In addressing decisions made under uncertain conditions, Frederickson and 
Smith (2003, 169) posit, “Decision rationality is bounded by uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of present actions, and even greater uncertainty regarding the possible 
future consequences of possible future decisions.”    
When choosing between the two options, it is rational for an organization to 
minimize uncertainty and risk in the name of organizational survival.  Again, if the 
organization is perfectly rational, why would they ever choose outside replacement? The 
explanation may be impossible to pin down, but we know it happens, so we must assume 
that the long-term goals of the decision-makers will be met at the cost of the short-term 
drop in performance. Based on the notion of “satisficing,” or “good enough” rationality, 
organizations may indeed choose an outsider as a replacement, costing immediate 
performance but moving organizational goals toward some established equilibrium. I 
call this the “weathering the storm” hypothesis, arguing that the benefit of long-term 
success will outweigh the costs of short-term failure. Governing bodies are a collection 
of individuals that mandate some collective values. If the values espoused by the 
governing body are at the core of the organizational stability and not too costly then 
weathering the storm is indeed a rational and reasonable explanation for hiring outside of 
the organizational structure. To illustrate this, I present a pair of hypothetical graphs of 
insider versus outsider succession, with some performance measure on the Y axis and 
time along the X axis.  The model is as follows: 
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332211 XXXOt ++++= βββα  
Where: 
=tO Performance 
=1X Time 
=2X 0 before the managerial change, and one thereafter 
=3X 0 before the managerial change, and 1, 2, 3… corresponding to the number of 
years since the change 
=I Insider replacement 
=I Outsider replacement 
 
Hence, the predictions from the discussion above are as follows: 
02 <β , meaning that short term performance is less than zero, or negative, and; 
 03 >β , meaning that long term performance is greater than zero, or positive. 
 
However, the insider versus outsider caveat is portrayed as follows: 
II 22 ββ > , but II 33 ββ < , meaning that in the short term, insider succession will have 
more positive affects than outsider replacement, but in the long term, the opposite is true. 
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Graphically, then, we expect to see the following relationships:13 
For organizations that suffer a succession event, and the replacement manager is 
selected from within the organization, performance will decrease slightly but the recover 
and continue at roughly the same pace as prior to the succession event, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 
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13 The numbers on the graphs are strictly hypothetical, designed to present the relationships over time.  
The numbers along the Y-axis for both graphs are hypothetical but designed to be ordinal in nature.  The 
vertical lines in both graphs represent the moment the succession event occurred.  All of the information to 
the left of the line pre-dates the succession event and this discussion makes no attempt to explain it.  It is 
what it is.  The information to the right of the succession line occurred after the succession event, and is of 
substantive importance to this discussion.  Note that performance prior to succession can look quite 
differently, which would change the slope of the lines post-succession, but the general trend is expected to 
be the same. 
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Conversely, when the replacement manager is recruited from outside the 
organizations, the slope of the performance indicator in the short-term is expected to be 
steeper, but quicker, and potentially, overall increased performance in the long-term is 
expected, as is depicted in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 
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To this point, the discussion has been conspicuously void of any discussion of 
organizational structure and its constraints on the manager’s ability to influence 
organizational performance. Is it possible that managerial skill is either enhanced or 
constrained by the structure of the organization?  Could it be that some organizational 
structures are more conducive to differing managerial strategies than others?  We find a 
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long-existing, albeit shallow literature, founded by Luther Gulick (1937)14 which argues 
that indeed, structure matters vis-à-vis span of control, and a second, deeper stream of 
literature founded by Max Weber (1946)  and his “ideal-type” bureaucracy, arguing that 
structural characteristics of organizations influence individual behavior.15 The strength 
and influence of Weber’s theoretical analyses are not constrained to public 
administration literature, but in sociology as well. 16  
Span of control refers to the way relationships between superiors and 
subordinates are structured in an organization (Meier and Bohte 2003). It argues that 
increasing the hierarchical structure reduces the span of control (Gulick, 1937; Meier 
and Bohte, 2000 and 2003; Hammond, 1990; Woodward, 1980; Holden, Pederson, and 
Germane, 1968; Hood and Dunshire, 1981; Carzo and Yanouzas, 1969; Brehm and 
Gates, 1997). “Span of control dictates that superiors should oversee a limited number of 
subordinates rather than a large number of subordinates. Monitoring and mentoring the 
work of subordinates is a less daunting task when the number of subordinates is small, 
                                                          
14 Luther Gulick was greatly influenced by the works of Henri Fayol (1916) who developed the six 
principles of management, namely, technical, commercial, financial, security, accounting, and managerial. 
Of most interest to Gulick, and to this study specifically, is the managerial principle, which includes, 
among other things, responsibility, discipline, and unity of command, which appear to be the foundations 
of Gulick’s notion of span of control. 
15 The concept of span of control suffered a near fatal blow by the revered Herbert Simon in “The Proverbs 
of Administration” (1946) in which Simon argued that the principles of management were vague and 
contradictory. This critique led to virtually no definitive empirical exploration of span of control until 
1990, when Hammond revived Gulick’s case.  Meier and Bohte (2000) followed with an attempt to 
reinvigorate and resurrect the study. ( See also Theobald and Nicholson-Crotty, 2005). 
16 Indeed, Weber was instrumental in defining the nature of bureaucracy that led to the study of 
organization theory.  His work greatly influenced Peter Blau (1955, 1960, 1968, and 1974; Blau and 
Schoenherr 1971), one of the founding fathers of sociological study of bureaucracy, as well as Charles 
Perrow (1961a, 1961b, 1967, 1974, 1986, and 1991).  Perrow’s work is often cited in political science 
literature.  One example is Brehm and Gates (1997) in their work on the rational behavior of bureaucrats 
relative to organizational oversight, which is cited in Rainey and Steinbauer (1999).  Rainey is one of the 
leading scholars on organizations in public administration and management literature. 
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but becomes more difficult when superiors are charged with overseeing a large number 
of individuals” (Meier and Bohte 2000, 116). A narrow span of control increases the 
amount of influence the superior can have on the subordinate, thus increasing the effect 
of the manager on the performance of the organization. In other words, narrow spans of 
control increase the monitoring capabilities of the superior and decreases subordinate 
shirking (Brehm and Gates 1997).  We would predict then, that even though there are 
more levels in the organizational structure, that changing managers, particularly those at 
the top levels in this hierarchical framework would have more impact on the 
performance of the organization. 
Max Weber posited an ideal-type bureaucracy that carried with it certain 
characteristics.  As Blau succinctly summarizes, Weber’s characterization of 
bureaucracy “is designed to induce an impersonal and rational orientation toward tasks 
which is conducive to efficient administration” (Blau 1955, 1). The distribution of 
activities, specialization and division of labor, systematic discipline and control, and 
consistent application of rules that Weber propagated have led some Weberian critiques 
to characterize his bureaucracy as increasing the levels in the hierarchy and 
centralization of authority lead to rigid, bureaucratic values, standard operating 
procedures, and cultural norms, all of which are designed to reduce the discretion of any 
individual in the hierarchy, effectively making managers replaceable parts of the 
organization. Weber’s ideal-type also reduces the need for constant managerial 
oversight, which greatly reduces the costs of monitoring, as very little discretion is 
afforded subordinates. We are likely to see little, if any, affect on performance when 
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managers in this hierarchical framework are replaced as bureaucratic values, standard 
operating procedures, and cultural norms take the place of leadership, or managerial 
influence. 
One final factor relating to managerial succession and organizational 
performance is frequency of succession.  How do organizations that frequently change 
managers fare in terms of performance relative to stable organizations? Turnover is a 
fact of life in the public sector, both at the street-level and the management level.  
Frequency of succession will, indeed, affect organizational performance.  This claim is 
based on the logical outgrowth of the theory posited, namely, that performance will 
decrease in the years directly following the succession event.  If the organization is still 
suffering from the short-term affects of a succession event and changes managers, then 
recovery could not have occurred and performance will drop further still with another 
succession event.  Relationships will not be forged, regime changes will not have had 
time to be implemented, and networks will not have been developed.  
Thus, the theory of managerial succession posited here will include aspects of 
short and long term impacts on performance, the structure of the organization, and the 
affect of frequent turnover on performance.  A number of hypotheses can be generated to 
test this theory of managerial succession. 
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Hypotheses 
 
I will present and test three primary hypotheses here, which can be broken down 
into a number of ancillary hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is related directly to 
organizational performance.  Based on the theoretical discussion above,  
Hypothesis One: Managerial succession has an effect on organizational 
performance. 
The overall affect of a succession event is not uniform, however.  Based on the 
possible performance outcomes above, the impact of a succession event may occur 
immediately or over the long-term.  Thus, 
 Hypothesis Two: Managerial succession will have an immediate effect as well as 
a long-term effect on organizational performance. 
 To test the theoretical discussion of where the replacement manager comes from, 
whether he is an insider or outsider, I posit the following hypothesis.  This hypothesis 
addresses the rationality of the agency in making hiring decisions, and has implications 
for the effect of public managers individually.  If, in fact, managers themselves matter, 
then based on the assumption that the new manager is better than the old one, the impact 
on the organization should be greater if the new manager is hired from outside of the 
hierarchy.  Internal hires are likely to have been trained and prepared by the exiting 
manager, and while they have some level of independence, they are still entrenched in 
the organizational culture.  An inside hire would signify a desire for conformity and 
continuity, while an external hire would signify a desire for change, be it short-term, 
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long-term, or both. A glance at the hypothetical graphs presented earlier provide visual 
context for this hypothesis. Thus: 
Hypothesis Three: The effect of succession is greater if the new manager is an 
external hire.  The short term effect is more negative while the long term effect is more 
positive. 
Logically then, an organization that sees managerial turnover more often is likely 
to see continually low performance, not necessarily because it keeps replacing a bad 
manager with a bad manager (although that may be the case), but the more likely 
explanation is because it is not allowing the new manager to affect performance.  For 
instance, the new manager is not able to develop the network or hierarchical 
relationships which reduce the costs associated with meeting the goals established by the 
organization. If the organization has a “quick trigger” when it comes to replacing 
managers, all aspects of managerial ability are hindered, and performance will be 
consistently lower than organizations with relative stability.  Thus,  
Hypothesis Four: Frequent succession events with have a negative effect on 
organizational performance. 
The next hypothesis is related directly to the motives of the replacement 
manager.  Organizations change managers for two primary reasons; either the incumbent 
was lost via his or her own volition, or performance was poor.  In the first scenario, the 
motives of the replacement manager are likely to reflect the incumbent manager, as the 
organization would desire as little disruption to performance as possible. The simplest 
way for an organization to accomplish this is by promoting the new manager from 
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within the hierarchical structure. The incumbent is likely to be greatly involved in the 
selection of the replacement manager, and will be expected to choose a replacement 
whose motives differ little from his own. This course of action will greatly decrease the 
transaction costs associated with the succession event.  Conversely, if performance is 
poor, the motives of the replacement manager are likely to be quite different from the 
incumbent manager as the organization is looking for a regime change to “right the 
ship.”  Again, the assumption is that new manager is better than the old one. Thus, the 
replacement manager is likely to be recruited from outside of the hierarchical structure, 
bringing a different set of skills and attributes to the organization.  As was hypothesized, 
any succession event will disrupt the normal flow of operations and lead to a decrease in 
performance. External replacement of management will require more time to recover 
from the shock of the succession event than an internal promotion.  Thus, 
Hypothesis Five: Organizations that promote replacement managers from within 
the hierarchy will see quicker recovery than organizations that recruit from outside the 
hierarchy. 
It stands, then, that if organizations look to reduce the time of recovery from the 
succession shock by internal promotion, then the experience of the replacement manager 
is also a useful strategy in moderating the impact of succession on performance.  
Managers with experience in the roles they are expected to fill will be able to reduce the 
costs associated with repairing relationships and reestablishing order, as well as reducing 
the time necessary for “on the job training.”  The skill set associated with experience 
will likely further minimize the effect of the succession event.  Thus,  
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 Hypothesis Six: The experience of the replacement manager will have a 
moderating effect on the change, thus reducing the amount of time needed to recover 
from the shock of a succession event. 
 Finally, the implications of succession on the network and the reestablishment of 
the network must be considered. Networking is becoming an integral component of 
studies of public management (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Bogason and Toonen, 
1998; Bressers, O’Toole, and Richardson, 1995; Goldsmith and Eggers, 2004; Klijn, 
1996; Mandell, 2001; Meier and O’Toole, 2005; Milward and Provan, 2000; O’Toole, 
1997; Peterson and O’Toole, 2001; Rhodes, 1997).17 As both the geo-centric and ego-
centric network literatures have shown, networks are prime components in public 
management, both theoretically and practically.  Understanding the structural design of a 
network allows for the assessment of interorganizational relationships and how they 
evolve in the public sector (Isset and Provan 2005).  Small-N studies such as McGuire 
(2002) and Provan and Milward (1995) are valid measures of networks, just as the large-
N studies of Meier and O’Toole are. Both geo-centric and ego-centric studies agree that 
networks are informal structures that are fluidly aligned, thus, must be carefully 
                                                          
17 The string of authors included is but a small sample of the works on networking and public 
management, and most, if not all of these authors have written a tremendous amount on this subject.  The 
research literature on networks is ever-expanding, particularly in terms of structural analysis, or geo-
centric networks the primarily are promoted by Milward and Provan, and the ego-centric networks of 
Meier and O’Toole (2005).  This analysis views networks as ego-centric. Designing the structure of the 
network is a valuable contribution to the literature, however, for this analysis, I view networks more as 
managerial tool, and as such, how they are exploited or buffered from the manager’s view is of central 
concern.  Structural design is not relevant to this discussion other than to say that managers have a 
network, and somehow each node in that network is directly related to them in some way that may or may 
not be able to influence performance. 
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managed. Network disruptions are likely to interrupt the balance of the network, which 
requires managers to potentially change their management strategy with the network.   
 It is clear from O’Toole and Meier (2003) that a system shock such as 
managerial succession will affect the behavior of the replacement manager in terms of 
dealing with environmental relationships, or networks. As time is a zero-sum game, the 
time the replacement manager spends networking relative to his other functions is likely 
to increase, as network relations will have to be solidified if the change came from 
within, or developed if the change was external. This will divert attention from the 
manager’s ability to devote that previously allocated time to performance directly, 
causing performance to decrease initially.  However, the initial investment in the 
network will compensate for the low short-term performance with higher long-term 
performance, at a lower cost to the manager.  Thus, 
 Hypothesis Seven:  Managerial succession causes an increase in time spent 
networking, causing performance to go down. 
 Hypothesis Eight: External replacement managers will spend more time 
networking than managers replaced from within. 
 Hypothesis Nine: New managers that network more are more likely to affect 
performance at a faster rate. 
These hypotheses will provide a greater understanding of the role of managers in 
organizational performance, specifically in the context of managerial change. 
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Measuring Key Variables 
Performance in public organizations is an oft-debated subject. As Anthony 
Downs says, few public organizations have any “direct way of evaluating their outputs 
in relation to the cost of the inputs used to make them” (1967, 30).  This is true in the 
effort to study management and performance from a quantitative perspective. What 
constitutes “performance?”  Is it a balanced budget?  Is it more positive feedback than 
negative feedback from the public or interest groups?  Or is it something more concrete, 
such as a certain value on standardized test scores, or a certain number of indigenous 
species saved? Performance may be something even more abstract, such as promoting 
democratic values of equity, efficiency, accountability, or responsiveness. Defining 
pubic organizational performance poses many problems, indeed. 
 Performance indicators in the public sector can be particularly juxtaposed.  For 
example, in a police department, is performance increasing as more criminals are jailed, 
signifying more aggressive investigative work by the Boys in Blue?  Couldn’t a decrease 
in jailed prisoners signify more aggressive community involvement and a greater 
presence by the police officer on the beat, resulting in fewer crimes?  Obviously, 
measuring performance in public organizations is never as clear-cut as we would like it 
to be.   
One explanation for unclear performance indicators is the very nature of public 
organizations.  Designed to implement public goods and services as designated by 
democratically elected representatives, the motivation of public organizations differs 
from private one. One motivation for private organizations is profit margins. It is 
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unlikely that there is a single business in the private sector not interested in increasing its 
profit margin.  On the contrary, public organizations have such a wide array of 
motivations, ranging from providing milk and cheese to poverty-stricken mothers to 
ensuring the legitimacy of our mattresses, that defining a uniform performance indicator 
over the range of public organizations is impossible. Furthermore, due to the lack of a 
“bottom-line” that is prevalent and explains performance in the private sector, the public 
sector is left to manufacture performance indicators from loose, often vague, legislative 
mandates. This leads to multiple problems.  First, legislative mandates vary widely from 
one public agency to another, thus comparing across agencies is nearly impossible.  
Second, vague mandates leads to wide discretion in the application of the rules, which 
has clear implications in a democratic system.  Finally, performance indicators often 
lack consistency, not only across organization, but over time as well.  Even though 
performance indicators are varied, vague, and inconsistent, the one “bottom line” that all 
public bureaucracies have is administrative responsibility. The American constitutional 
system demands responsibility from its administrations, thus, as Kettl and Fessler argue, 
“Government does indeed have a bottom line; it is administrative responsibility, not only 
for administering programs efficiently but also for ensuring that both the process and its 
results are accountable to elected officials and, ultimately, to the people” (Kettl and 
Fessler 2005, 2). 
 For example, the Texas Commissioner of Education and the State Board of 
Education mandate that “The mission of the Texas Education Agency is to provide 
leadership, guidance, and resources to help schools meet the educational needs of all 
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students” (Texas Education Agency Mission and Responsibility 2006).   This mission 
statement provides those managing Texas public schools vague direction in terms of 
measuring performance. Indeed, placing a numeric value on the “educational needs” of 
the children of Texas is difficult, but the methodology outlined below will help to 
develop objective performance measures to test the impact of school superintendents, 
and hopefully, can be generalized to other public managers. 
 
Summary 
 
Managerial succession affects public organizational performance.  I have laid out 
a theory of managerial succession that helps explain first, how managerial succession 
relates to organizational performance, and second how management matters. 
Managerial succession should affect organizational performance both in the 
immediate future and over a long period of time.  A host of factors can have an effect on 
the magnitude of the affect on performance.  The theory outlines factors such as where 
the replacement manager comes from, the structure of the organization, and the 
frequency with which organizations change managers.  There are also a host of control 
variables that will affect performance.  Some of these include the experience of the 
replacement manager and the time spent in and contact with the network.  
Indeed, recognizing that managerial succession can and does influence 
organizational performance has normative implications, as well.  Namely, when should 
public organizations change managers, and how should they go about picking 
replacements? These are valuable questions and will merit discussion, as we shall see in 
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the concluding chapter of this dissertation.  This theory of managerial succession has 
implications for the study of management generally, and will, with any luck, add to our 
understanding of public managers as more than simply budget maximizers, as Niskanen 
(1971) argues, or oversight mechanisms, but an invaluable institution within bureaucracy 
that can and does influence performance. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EFFECTS OF MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION ON ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE:  TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
 
As Chapter II demonstrated, scholarship on public management has existed, and 
will continue to exist, relative to organizational performance (Barnard 1939, Brudney, 
O’Toole, and Rainey 2000, Nicholson-Crotty and O’Toole 2004, Rainey 2003).  Case 
studies of specific managers or a single organization have been extremely valuable as 
foundations for understanding the complex interrelations between managers and 
performance. Building on these case studies, a more rigorous attempt at empirical, 
quantitative studies is starting to permeate the study of public administration.  For 
example, studies have now examined how performance is influenced by networks 
(O’Toole and Meier 1999, Provan and Milward 1995, Milward and Provan 1998), 
strategy (Boyne and Walker 2004), and governance (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001).  
Despite the recent surge in quantitative studies of public management, one issue that has 
not been explored is the extent to which organizational performance is affected when top 
management is changed. Studying the effect of managerial succession on organizational 
performance from a large-N perspective will assist in building the growing body of 
public management scholarship by allowing for more generalizability and by 
contextualizing evidence on single organizations.18 
                                                          
18 Portions of this chapter appear in the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 15:4, 2005. 
There have however, been substantive changes to the empirical analysis as well as the theoretical 
construction. 
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This chapter begins with a brief re-visitation of the theory of succession outlined 
in the Chapter II, followed by an empirical test of the hypotheses presented.  The 
empirical tests in this chapter lead us to conclude that managerial succession has a small, 
but significant influence on organizational performance. 
 
Theory of Managerial Succession 
 There is little public administration literature looking specifically at how 
managerial succession affects organizational performance.  Numerous scholars have 
addressed managerial change in some form.   McGregor (1974) and Nigro and Meier 
(1975) study the issue of mobility of career bureaucrats through the civil service 
organization. Goodman (1982) views managerial change as elusive, something that 
cannot be clearly or accurately tested.  O’Toole and Meier (2003) look at organizational 
stability, but do not explicitly address the impacts of managerial change.  They argue 
that organizational stability leads to more efficient functioning.  In short, the research 
questions in this paper are not expressly addressed in any of these bodies of literature. 
 The primary work available on the effects of managerial succession on 
organizational performance is Boyne and Dahya (2002). The premise of the theoretical 
model they develop is that “the motives of chief executives, the means at their disposal 
and the opportunities available” (2002, 179) are the primary independent variables that 
affect performance when management is changed. Boyne and Dahya provide the 
theoretical groundwork for succession studies; however, their model is limited in its 
ability to explain the long-term ramifications of change.  The theory posited here divides 
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the study of managerial succession into short-term and long-term effects on 
performance; however, a brief discussion of the Boyne and Dahya model is necessary to 
establish the basis for the effect of succession on performance. 
 
Boyne/Dahya Model 
Boyne and Dahya’s theory of managerial succession (2002) claims that 
managerial succession affects organizational performance.    Their theory consists of 
three elements: means, motives and opportunities.   
 Boyne and Dahya identify means as power, personal characteristics, and 
managerial “fit.”  The official, or formal powers, afforded a public manager are often 
vague and vary widely across organizations.  Boyne and Dahya cite Morphet (1993, iii) 
as follows:  “The way in which this role [the chief executive’s job] is performed rests far 
more heavily on the personality and charisma of the postholder than any legal or 
traditional rights.”19  Travers et al. (1997) also argue that autonomy is fundamental to 
managers accomplishing their goals. These views of charismatic and non-traditional 
leadership imply that top managers have the potential to influence performance based 
primarily on their priorities. In the absence of (or non-recognition of) formal powers, 
Boyne and Dahya argue, managerial skill or style may play an important role in 
determining organizational outcomes (see also Canella and Monroe, 1997; Conger and 
Kanungo, 1987).  
                                                          
19 Morphet is in clear contradiction to Weber’s legal-rational bureaucracy, which is rules-based and builds 
authority not on charisma and personality but on legal authority.  This will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapter. 
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Autonomy and charisma however, are difficult concepts to operationalize, but 
they can be thought of in terms of relationships.  Managers cannot function in an 
organizational vacuum.  They must rely on their skill and charisma to develop organize 
and develop relationships with others, both within and outside the organization.  The 
more skilled managers are at this relationship building, or “networking,” the more likely 
they are to use their power to influence performance. Thus, Boyne and Dahya’s 
conception of means can be operationalized as managing the network.  
While Boyne and Dahya’s characterization of means is a useful one and my 
operationalization of it as networking will be employed in this analysis, I would add to 
the definition a discussion on resources.  Clearly, resources ought to be considered as 
components of a manager’s ability to accomplish his or tasks.  For example, a district 
with better teachers, more teachers, and more funding for the students should be able to 
outperform a district with lesser means.  It stands, then, that means are not only as Boyne 
and Dahya describe as autonomy and the means to make decisions, but actual fiduciary 
means as well.  A collection of these two items will make up the concept of means 
throughout this analysis. 
The motives are akin to managerial style.  Boyne and Dahya (2002) distinguish 
between motives of pragmatism, altruism, and egoism.  Pragmatists have no personal 
motives.  They exist to do the will of the organization, interpreted as the preferences of 
its political principals.  New managers with pragmatic motives are strong believers in the 
politics-administration dichotomy; that the bureaucracy exists as the neutral, functioning 
arm of politicians.  Altruists are primarily interested in promoting public welfare. They 
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have a great sense of duty to the clients whom they serve.  Finally, managers may be 
egoists who, as suggested by public choice theory, are primarily selfish (Boyne 1998).20 
Should this trichotomy of motives somehow determine organizational performance?  If 
we believe that managers matter, then we hark back to the discussion of insider versus 
outsider replacement.  If the motives of the prior manager were altruistic, and the 
motives of replacement manager are altruistic, then it is unlikely that we will see much 
of change in organizational performance.  However, if for example the motives of the 
prior manager were altruistic and the motives of the replacement manager egoistic, then 
it stands that the difference in the motives of the manager would impact his or her 
priorities, which will, in turn, affect performance. Furthermore, we might be able to 
predict to some degree, the outcomes based on where the replacement manager comes 
from. Recall that the graphs in chapter II show the hypothetical outcome of an outside 
hire of the replacement manager.  I argued that outside hires, barring retirement or 
voluntary removal, are likely due to some desire of a change in organizational regime.  
What better way to change the regime than to replace the manager with a manager with 
different motives? Conversely, were the manager to come from inside the hierarchy, the 
motives of the new manager would likely be very similar to the prior manager as the 
prior manager likely had a hand in “raising” and grooming the replacement manager.  
Thus, the difference between the motives of the new manager and the old manager 
should have a significant influence on organizational performance.   
                                                          
20 For a more exhaustive treatment of public choice theory, see also Buchanan and Tollison (1972), 
Musgrave (1959), Olson (1971), and Samuelson (1954). 
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The opportunities of new leaders can be defined in terms of internal and external 
constraints on the strategies they adopt.  Internal constraints can be conceptualized as the 
preferences of political principals and their expectations for the manager.  For example, 
internal constraints can be related to the budget, or hiring and firing preferences, over 
which the manager has little control.  The legal and socioeconomic environment in 
which the manager finds him-or herself defines external constraints, many of which are 
also outside the control of top managers.  However, as Boyne and Dahya argue, “a new 
chief executive may be able to reinterpret the environment in a way that provides more 
scope for improving organizational performance” (2002, 191).  Viewing the 
environment with “fresh eyes” may allow a new manager to exploit the environment, 
and thereby influence performance. 
The Boyne and Dahya model can only provide us very general guidelines, 
however. The effects of managerial succession are more than just means, motives and 
opportunities.  In order to further explain the effects of managerial succession on 
performance, I reiterate that succession events affect performance in two distinct ways: 
first, the immediate effect on managerial succession on performance is negative, and 
second, over time, the effect of a succession event will weaken as the replacement 
manager begins to rebuild hierarchical and network relations, driving performance in a 
positive direction.  Furthermore, where the replacement manager comes from and how 
much experience he or she has are important factors contributing to organizational 
performance.  
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Data and Methods 
In the public sector, performance is typically measured in terms of accomplishing 
goals established by the manager or the manager’s superiors.  Senior executives are   
pulled in different directions by the competing values of different stakeholders, 
including- the governing body under which they serve, the elected officials to whom 
they report, and the public at large.  Goals are also constantly shifting over time.21  With 
goals shifting and no single indicator to describe performance in the public sector, it is 
preferred to test a model of executive succession on a set of organizations that have 
similar structures and objectives; organizations that have the same performance indicator 
across all of its organizational units. Thus I will use Texas school districts and their 
superintendents as the focus of this analysis. The data were collected from a survey 
administered through the Texas Educational Excellence Project (TEEP) and the Project 
for Equity, Representation, and Governance (PERG) at Texas A&M University. The 
survey was sent to all of the district superintendents in the state of Texas. All of the other 
data were gathered from the Texas Education Agency.  The time series is from 1995-
1999. The units of analysis here are school districts.  The manager in question is the 
district superintendent.  The superintendent, as the primary appointed figure in the 
school district, is responsible to the public and the political principals (school board and 
legislators) for the performance of the district.   
Texas operates a fairly decentralized school system as most authority lies in the  
                                                          
21 See Chun and Rainey (2005) for an exhaustive treatment of goal ambiguity. 
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local districts with some intervention from the state.  The state has set basic 
accountability guidelines, and how the districts choose to implement them is left to their 
discretion.  School districts are also special districts, which sets them apart from other 
bureaucracies as it allows them to levy their own taxes, giving them even more 
discretion as they are not completely reliant on the legislature for their budget. That 
freedom from legislative control allows the superintendent to create a regime conducive 
to his motives or goals.  For example, the superintendent has some discretion to hire 
subordinates (principals, vice-principals, and teachers) who best reflect his goals, and 
more importantly, best able to enforce his directives.  Also, the superintendent can have 
differing levels of interaction with others in the external environment without always 
having to get permission from or justify the interaction to the legislature.  All of these 
factors can influence performance. If the superintendent is perceived as being effective 
or efficient (or both) the citizens are likely to grant him more authority, or at the very 
least, not take authority away. Thus, the decentralized nature of school districts should 
amplify the influence of the superintendents and their impact on performance.  
School district decentralization filters down to personnel and curriculum 
decisions, as well.  Districts can make all of their own personnel and curriculum 
decisions. In most federal bureaucracies and, to some degree, in state bureaucracies, 
bureaucrats adhere to the General Schedule (GS) or some state derivation thereof.  The 
GS sets regulations on who can be hired, how much they can be paid, and it also 
provides a job description for each category in the Schedule.  The Civil Service and the 
GS provide very little decision-making authority for the top level managers to set salary, 
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distribute bonuses, negotiate contracts, or recruit the “best and the brightest.”  School 
districts, generally, do not adhere to the state or federal General Schedule, and thus it is 
more likely that the superintendent can influence these aspects of performance, although 
the superintendent is subject to the limits of licensing laws.22  Thus, local autonomy 
makes school districts an excellent organization for studying the impacts of 
management.  
 How can superintendents influence performance? Superintendents report only to 
one political principal, namely, the local school board.  By virtue of sitting atop the 
hierarchy, they are able to hire, train, and motivate mid-level managers, such as 
principals and assistant principals.  They are also able to establish, foster, and tend to 
relations outside of the hierarchy, namely networks.  Networks are a highly personal 
endeavor, and something the superintendent has some control over.  Finally, 
superintendents can adopt and implement educational reforms that best reflect their 
managerial philosophy.  All of these functions attribute to “managing” the organization, 
thus, provide a uniquely rich field in which to test managerial succession. Thus, 
superintendents’ ability to influence performance is widespread.   
Students, up through 2003, participated in a standardized test every year.  The 
results of this test, the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills, or TAAS, are highly  
                                                          
22 There are exceptions to every rule, of course.  In school districts that are under federal authority, i.e., 
schools on Indian reservations, the teachers are classified and paid via the Federal General Schedule.  
However, as the number of Indian educators is a very small fraction of the overall educational workforce 
(BIA operates 61 schools and contracts to 123 others to be operated via Native American tribes (www. 
Biaeducationjobs.com)), and as Texas has no schools operated on or by Indian reservations, in this study, 
the point is moot. 
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salient to the district, superintendent, and public in general.  The results are published in 
local newspapers, and many superintendents are judged, not only by the school board, 
but also implicitly by the community, on the outcomes of this test, in effect, holding 
them accountable for the outcomes of the exams.  The data available offer a valuable 
start for studying the questions associated with managerial change, and provides a 
vehicle through which we can determine if top managers matter.   
  In Texas there are approximately 1000 public school districts.  These districts 
provide a great laboratory for the study of public organizations across time as they have 
similar structure and goals, and are easily comparable.  The unit of analysis is the school 
district.  The manager in question is the district superintendent.  As the primary 
spokesperson for the district, the superintendent bears great responsibility, and fulfills 
many of the roles that would qualify him or her as “a top-level manager.”   
A survey was sent to each of the superintendents in 1999, which serves as the 
primary data source for this analysis.  The performance data come from the Texas 
Education Association, and were pooled for 5 years, providing a time series dataset with 
5 years of performance data. 
To test the hypotheses, I use traditional OLS multiple regression analysis, 
employing a fixed effects model to account for variation over time. This should help to 
ensure that any results are not the product of general trends or other unknown factors 
that are shifting the regression line over time. 
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Hypotheses 
In order to address the effects of managerial succession we must break it into the 
immediate, short-term effect and ultimate, long-term effect. I argue that managerial 
change has a negative impact on performance in the short-term.  Boyne and Dahya do 
not provide us with a theoretical basis for such a claim; however, it can be justified on 
the basis of the literature and theory presented in the prior chapters.  According to the 
O’Toole/Meier (1999) model of public management, organizations must decide among 
three tasks when allocating managerial resources.23  They are the manager’s contribution 
to the internal structure and stability of the organization, the manager’s efforts in 
exploiting the environmental conditions, and the manager’s attempt to buffer against 
environmental shocks.  The O’Toole/Meier model predicts that a change in any or all of 
these managerial contributions will influence performance. In the model, M1, or the 
manager’s contribution to the internal structure, implies a relationship with the 
organizational hierarchy.  It takes time for a relatively static, entrenched bureaucracy to 
adapt to new managers and their strategies.  When a manager is changed and a 
replacement is instituted, the hierarchical structure will take some time to adapt to the 
new mode of leadership.  Thus, the relationship between the bureaucrat and manager 
changes, leading to instability and a decrease in performance.   
                                                          
23 The O’Toole and Meier (1999 and 2000) general model of management is as follows: ( ) ( )( ) tttt MMHXOMHO εββ +++= − 432111 // where O is some measure of outcome; 
H is a measure of hierarchy; M is a measure of management that is divided into three parts; and X is a 
vector of environmental forces.  1β and 2β are estimable parameters and tε is an error term. 
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M3, or the exploitation condition, follows a similar pattern.  Managers can exert a 
significant amount of energy in fostering relationships with the community outside of 
their organizations.  In other words, networking externally can be an important function 
of managing an organization.  Network building of this sort is a highly personal 
endeavor, and once a manager leaves the setting, the M3 term’s contribution to 
performance will most likely become smaller, implying that changing managers will 
have a negative impact on the relationships developed between the organization and the 
set of external actors.  The same stands true for M4, or environmental buffering.  New 
managers would have to spend more time and energy buffering against environmental 
shocks because they do not have their own network structure in place to buffer for them.  
These several forms of managerial influence are not explored directly in the current 
analysis. Rather, a consideration of them leads to an expectation of negative impacts on 
performance following a managerial succession event.  Still, while some networked 
relations can be damaged with the loss of the old manager, a new superintendent who is 
promoted internally will already have a set of known external actors in place by virtue of 
previous ties to the organizations. This line of reasoning leads to my first two 
hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis One:  A change in management will have a negative effect on 
organizational performance. 
 Hypothesis Two: The negative effect of succession is greater if the new manager 
is an external hire. 
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Also, some managers will be better at building and fostering relationships than others 
due in part to their managerial experience.  The learning curve for a new manager, we 
can predict, is much sharper than the curve for a new manager with prior managerial 
experience, affecting the new manager’s ability to influence performance.  This rationale 
leads to the third hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis Three: The negative effect of succession is mitigated by the 
experience of the replacement manager. 
 The fourth hypothesis is related to the long-term implications of change.  
O’Toole and Meier (2003) argue that stability, an out-of-fashion concept in 
organizational theory, is a fundamental aspect of public organizations.  As organizational 
management becomes more stable, internal and external organizational relationships will 
become more stable as well.  This stability will reduce the external transaction costs of 
managers, allowing them to focus more on improving performance.  Again, if we 
assume the organization hired a better manager than the one it replaced, then over time, 
after the new manager has had time to stabilize in the environment and the hierarchy, 
organizational performance improves. Thus, 
 Hypothesis Four: The further an organization gets from a managerial succession 
event, the greater the likelihood that the organization’s performance will become more 
positive. 
 Finally, I refer back to the discussion of networking. A network, as defined by 
Meier and O’Toole (2003), is “a pattern of two or more units, in which not all major 
components are encompassed within a single hierarchical array.”  As a result, managers 
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may be able to reduce their transaction costs by acting in conjunction with other “units.” 
Interaction with other units in the networked environment (both private and public units) 
allows managers to have more resources at their disposal, either political or financial. 
Thus, we are led to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis Five:  New managers that network more are more likely to improve 
performance. 
Finally, the model assumes that opportunities are fundamental in determining the 
performance of the organization.  Opportunities are defined in terms of constraints; 
“whether new chief executives have the opportunity to influence organizational 
performance will depend on the constraints that they face” (Boyne and Dahya 2002, 
191).  Internal constraints include hierarchical, political, and cultural factors. External 
constraints are factors such as legal, social, and constituent constraints.   The constraint 
variables in this analysis are a mix of internal and external.  The list includes: the 
percentage of minority students in the district, the percentage of low-income students as 
external, or social constraints; and the percentage of non-certified teachers in the district 
as a hierarchical constraint facing the superintendent. 
 Hence, managerial succession has an affect when the new manager is hired with 
a new motive and outlook, and can function within and manipulate the constraints on 
organizational strategy. In terms of an empirical application, a mathematical model 
might look like this: 
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∆ 0t = 1β  + 2β  (Motives) + 3β  (Means) + 4β  (Constraints) + 5β  (Change) + tε  
Where: 
O = Performance (change in TAAS pass rates) 
Motives = Internal versus External Hire 
Means = Autonomy, or Networking ability and Resources24 
Constraints = List of external and internal constraints 
Change = Managerial change  
β  =Some estimable parameter 
tε  = Error  
 
Dependent Variables 
The results of the TAAS test are used to represent organizational performance.  
Organizational performance is a politically constructed output that is designed to fulfill 
the demands of stakeholders.  In this case, the political constructor of the pass rates is the 
State Board of Education at the behest of the legislature. This test is administered in 
every district in Texas on a consistent and predictable timetable (at the time of the 
survey, it was administered to 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 10th graders, statewide).  The TAAS 
test is also a highly salient issue with the public.  The overall district scores are 
published in the local newspapers; and the superintendent, as the chief administrator for 
the district, will generally be responsible for the results.  Performance on this statewide 
test is one of the primary indicators of the effect of a new superintendent, thus the TAAS 
pass rate will be the primary dependent variable in this study. Since the data set covers 
five years, with around 1000 districts, the number of observations in the short-term 
                                                          
24 Resources in the model are teacher salary, student/teacher ratio, and revenue/pupil. 
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model is 5213.  However, data on the network variables is not available for all districts, 
leaving a sample size of 2534.  In testing for long-term effects, note that there is a 
significant number of districts that had no change during the test period.  Since this test 
is designed to measure the effects of succession over the long-term, it excludes those 
districts with no change, resulting in a sample size of 542. 
Other performance indicators are the percentage of students who score above 
1110 on the SAT, as well as the percentage of students who take advanced placement 
classes, dropout rates, and attendance rates.  These performance indicators help to 
identify some of the goals, or motives, of the superintendents.   
 
Independent Variables 
The hypotheses argue that managerial succession has a short term as well as a 
long term effect on organizational performance.  Consequently, the time between each 
year, or the immediate change, is the primary short term independent variable for the 
Texas dataset.  This variable is dichotomous, coded as a zero if the calendar rolled over 
and there was no change in management, or coded as a one if there was managerial 
succession.  The independent variable for the long-term analysis is recovery time, or 
years from the time of the succession event to the end of the study.  The rest of this 
section will provide an in-depth explanation of the independent variables, beginning the 
short-term change variable. 
I created a dummy variable called “managerial change” for any school district 
that had a superintendent change any time during the five years of the test period (1995-
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1999).  The change was determined by the “years in current position” question on the 
survey (Texas Educational Excellence Project First Superintendent Survey, 1999). The 
variable was coded as a 1 if there was change in a given year, 0 if no change.  Any 
district with a value here of greater than 5 years (as 5 years is the length of the test 
period) was coded as a “no change” district.  The managerial change variable is the 
variable that is of primary concern in the short-term analysis. This measure tells you if 
there was one change in the organization, but no more. 
In order to test the long-term effect of change, I have created a variable for 
districts that had a superintendent change called the “recovery” variable.  The recovery 
variable is an ordinal value representing the number of years that have passed from the 
change in superintendent to the end of the test period.  More explicitly, if the managerial 
change occurred in 1998, the recovery variable is coded as 1, 1997 as 2, 1996 as 3 and 
1995 as 4.  It is hypothesized that the farther removed the organization is from change, 
the more positive the results will be, or the less likely that managerial succession will 
have a negative effect on performance.  
Included in the model are a number of controls and constraints associated with 
superintendent behavior in a school district.  First, the constraint variables are the 
percentage of Black students in the district, the percentage of Hispanic students, and the 
percentage of low-income students. These variables are standard predictors of 
organizational performance that exist outside of the direct control of the superintendent.  
The education policy literature has routinely shown that these variables are consistent 
predictors of performance (Burtless 1996; Jencks and Phillips 1998).  They are also 
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issues that superintendents must deal with, and must be controlled for. As a hierarchical 
constraint, I include in the model a measure of the percentage of non-certified teachers in 
the district. Districts with a greater number of non-certified teachers may struggle in 
terms of TAAS performance.   
Other variables related to the means of the manager are resources.  Monetary 
resources such as money to spend on the children and the teachers, and non-monetary 
resources such as the number of teachers in the school should soften the shock of a 
succession event.  In an attempt to control for school wealth and to provide some 
consistency across analyses in this dissertation, I include in the both the short-term and 
the long-term models teacher salary, student/teacher ratio, and revenue per pupil. 
 To test the hypotheses dealing with the effects of internal versus external 
replacement, I distinguish between managerial promotion from within the hierarchy and 
recruitment from outside the hierarchy. A dummy variable called “external change” 
measures whether or not the replacement superintendent was recruited from outside the 
hierarchy.  Taking the number of years of service in their current job and subtracting that 
value from their total years of service in the district can determine this.  If that number 
was greater than zero (0), then I can assume that the superintendent was promoted from 
within the organization.  If the number was less than or equal to zero (0) I can assume 
that he or she was recruited from outside of the organization.   
The external change variable is not enough to capture the full meaning of change 
via internal promotion or change via external hire.  To get the clearest picture of the 
effects of internal change or external change, I go back to the theory presented here and 
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the manager’s ability to develop and foster relationships. This relationship building, or 
networking, is requisite to the success of the manager, so the inclusion of networking as 
an independent variable seems justified. It was constructed as a composite of the 
frequencies of managerial interaction with five different network management actors, 
created using factor analysis (Meier and O’Toole, 2003). Interactions with the five 
environmental actors--school board members, local business leaders, other school 
superintendents, state legislators, and the Texas Education Agency all loaded positively 
on the first factor. The factor analysis produced an eigenvalue of 2.07.  Only the first 
factor was significant.  The survey asked the superintendents how often they interacted 
with the environmental actors, scaled from zero to five; five being the highest level of 
interaction (daily) and zero being the lowest level of interaction (never).  As Meier and 
O’Toole (2003) argue, those with more frequent interaction with the environmental 
actors are likely to have a management style more conducive to networking.  
Networking, then, as a strategic managerial tool, will be uniquely implemented among 
replacement superintendents, and we would expect to see more network management 
associated with short-term performance. Conversely, we would expect to see negative 
network management associated with long-term performance. 
To control for the experience of the superintendent, I created a dummy variable, 
named “experience,” which is ranked 1 if the new managers had prior experience and 
zero if they had no prior experience. If a manager enters a new organization as a first 
time manager, he or she will have a greater learning curve than those managers that 
come into the new organization with experience.   We would predict that new managers 
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with prior experience would still have a negative impact on short-term performance, 
however, that impact will be less than new managers with no experience. 
I interact the network variable with the managerial change variable, creating the 
“network*change” variable.  This interaction tests the effect of managerial change and 
networking together on TAAS pass rates. I also interact the external change variable 
with the networking variable to create the “network*external hire” variable which tests 
the implications of internal versus external hire and its effect on the network in relation 
to TAAS pass rates.  
Finally, in order to test the effect of managerial succession over the long-term, it 
is necessary to compare those districts with managerial change to those with no 
managerial change.  I created a dummy variable called “succession,” which is coded as 
zero for all districts with no managerial change, and coded as a one for the 542 districts 
that had some long-term change.  The dependent variable in this final analysis is the 
district TAAS pass rates.  This test will allow for a comparison of all the districts 
(change districts to no-change districts irrespective of short-term or long-term 
designation) to determine if the act of changing superintendents makes a difference to 
performance. 
 
Results 
 The results of the short-term analysis present an interesting dilemma.  First, the 
managerial change variable is consistently in the predicted direction; however, it is 
statistically insignificant, implying that the effect of a succession event is not necessarily 
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felt in the following year.25 Yet, the external hire variable is negative and statistically 
significant in the short-term model, implying that replacing superintendents from outside 
of the hierarchy has a negative short-term effect on performance (see table on page 71). 
However, when external hire is interacted with networking (which is insignificant) it 
loses significance. Furthermore, two of the three resource variables are significant.  Of 
the three, only revenue per pupil is insignificant.  Both teacher salary, which is positive, 
and student/teacher ratio, which is negative, are significant in all three models.26   
The short-term model confirms, then, that two of the conditions in place to 
reduce the impact of a succession event are significant and in the predicted direction. 
They are the opportunities afforded the replacement manager, or the percentage of black 
and Hispanic students and percentage of non-certified teachers, and the motives of the 
replacement manager, or the external hire condition. Interestingly, the means available, 
at least in terms of networking does not significantly affect the new manager’s ability to 
influence performance. However, if we consider means to be the resources available to 
the manager in both monetary and non-monetary terms, we see that all but revenue per 
pupil is significant. Thus, while the shock (Xt in the O’Toole/Meier model) of a 
succession event itself is not significant in the short-term model except when the 
                                                          
25 When testing for collinearity, I found that the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) = 1.80, signifying 
essentially no collinearity.  The highest VIF was only 2.64 for the percentage of Hispanics in the district. 
26 One interesting finding here is that when the analysis is run with the pass rates for black students only, 
the change variable is negative and significant.  While I have posited no theoretical expectation for 
managerial succession impacting one group more than another, the result is consistent with some of the 
work of Meier and O’Toole suggesting the organizational stability matters more for disadvantaged 
students. 
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replacement manager is hired externally, the motives and opportunities of the managers 
are.   
 Again, of interest in the short-term are the constraint variables.  All of the 
relationships were negative and significant, but the size of the coefficients would imply 
that they had little substantive effect. We see, then, that the control variables associated 
with this model affect, if ever so slightly, organizational performance.  Furthermore, of 
the interactions posited, none of them are significant.  Most of this is likely due to the 
non-impact of networking on short-term performance.  Thus, in terms of explaining 
short-term impacts on performance, executive succession itself is not as important as 
where the replacement manager comes from. 
 The tables on pages 75 through 82 show the results for the other dependent 
variables in the short-term analysis, namely dropout rates (page 75), students in AP 
classes (page 77), percent daily attendance (page 79) and scoring above 1110 on the 
SAT (page 81).  In all tests, we see roughly the same pattern. Never does the change 
variable come up significant, thus we are left to accept the null hypothesis of change 
having no effect on short-term performance.  Also of note is that with dropout rates as 
the dependent variable, external hire is again significant, but this time it is positive as 
opposed to negative (page 75).  Along the same line, with attendance as the dependent 
variable (page 79), external hire is negative and significant, as was the case in the all-
pass analysis. External hire was insignificant on both the AP class analysis and the SAT 
analysis.  In all of the short-term analyses, at least two of the three resource variables 
were significant.  Consistent with the original short-term analysis (page 71) neither the 
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networking variable nor the experience variable were statistically significant in any of 
the other models. 
 However, as time passes, the relationship between change and performance shifts 
from a negative relationship to a positive relationship (see page 73).  The recovery 
variable presents strong evidence that, holding all else constant, executive succession 
will increase TAAS pass rate change by around 6 points, controlling for the influence of 
time.  This finding is highly significant and allows us to accept hypothesis four, namely 
the further an organization gets from a succession event, the more of an impact change 
has on performance because it has allowed the organization time to conform and adapt to 
the new regime. Stated differently, these data support the claim that managerial 
succession does in fact lead to better long-term organizational performance.  
Interestingly, the sign and significance of the control variables, for the most part, do not 
change from the short-term to the long-term model. The resource variables however do 
drop out of significance. Also of interest is the outcome of the external hire variable, 
which loses significance.  This implies that, as time goes by, it does not seem to matter 
much where the replacement manager comes from, nor what his or her resources are 
like, as long as the manager is given time to implement the new regime. Furthermore, 
the prior experience of the replacement manager has no substantive effect on change in 
organizational performance. Once again, we see that networking has essentially no 
impact on organizational performance in districts with succession events. 
To get a complete picture of the long-term effects of organizational performance, 
I compare districts that had no change in managers to districts with managerial change.  
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The table on page 73 provides us insight to only those districts which experienced a 
succession event. The table on page 83 splits the districts into two groups; those with a 
succession event, and those without a succession event.  Unlike the short-term model, 
those districts that had a change were coded as a one for all years, versus those that had 
no change, coded as a zero. Over time, the full sample shows that “succession” districts 
performed better than districts that had no change.  Districts with no change were 
relatively stagnant, with a mean increase in the pass rate of around 4 percent over the 
four-year period, while change districts saw a mean pass rate change of around 9 
percent.  Overall, the pass rate for districts with change is about 6 points better than 
districts with no change, holding all else constant, which implies that changing managers 
has some positive influence on performance. Thus, over time, districts with managerial 
succession saw a general rise in pass rates compared to districts with no change in 
superintendent. 
 
Conclusion 
 What can be concluded from this application of a model of managerial 
succession?  One conclusion that can be made is that it is clear that managerial change 
matters.  Furthermore, managerial succession has an effect on organizational 
performance.  Meier and O’Toole (2003) have shown that networking is an important 
activity of public managers. However, in terms of succession, networking does not prove 
to be statistically significant. This is quite surprising given the likelihood that managers 
would need to foster new relationships both within the hierarchy as well as in the 
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external environment, irrespective of whether they were hired from the inside or the 
outside. It appears that, when the shock of a managerial change is introduced, the 
motives of the manager and the opportunities available are more pressing than dealing 
with the network. 
Another conclusion to be drawn is related to the rationality of managerial 
succession.  I argued in the theory that if short-term change led to poor performance, 
then aside from quitting or retirements, why would any rational organization ever change 
managers?  One might argue that the if an agency is under political fire due to poor 
performance, then changing managers were only prove to stoke the fire.  However, the 
theory argued that organizations are likely to absorb short-term loss for long-term gain.  
The tests in this analysis confirm that theory.  When the change districts were compared 
with the non-change districts, the change districts showed a sharper increase in test 
scores than did the non-change districts.  Thus, change and patience pays off.  These 
data cannot address what happens with multiple managerial changes, but that question 
will be addressed in chapter VI.  Clearly, organizations, when given time to recover from 
a succession event, yield positive performance. 
Is managerial change good or bad for performance?  The results of this analysis 
imply that changing managers does not affect the following year’s performance, as 
Tables 3.1-3.6 show.  Furthermore, Table 3.1 implies that as long as the replacement 
manager comes from within the hierarchical structure, succession matters. By contrast, if 
the new manager is hired externally, performance the following year is likely to drop, 
which not only adds to the pressure of the new manager, but could also affect political 
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considerations for the organization as well. Conversely, what we learn from Table 3.2 is 
an argument for patience.  The longer an organization can stay with a new manager, the 
more likely it is to see better results.  In short, I find evidence that top managers make a 
difference.   
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Table 3.1 
  The Short-Term Effect of Managerial Succession on Student Pass Rates 
 
Dependent Variable: All Student 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
Managerial Change -.485 
(1.60) 
-.378 
(1.25) 
 
-.371 
(1.23) 
Lagged Pass Rate .724** 
(65.36) 
.736** 
(65.33) 
 
.736** 
(65.30) 
% Black Students -.063** 
(5.51) 
-.062** 
(5.56) 
-.062** 
(5.51) 
% Hispanic Students -.041** 
(5.81) 
-.041** 
(5.97) 
 
-.041** 
(5.93) 
% Low-Income Students -.010 
(1.08) 
-.005 
(0.59) 
 
-.006 
(0.62) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -.084** 
(3.54) 
-.079** 
(3.31) 
 
-.078** 
(3.31) 
Networking  .158 
(1.55) 
.117 
(1.04) 
 
Managerial Experience  -.118 
(0.16) 
.221 
(0.27) 
 
External Hire  -1.77** 
(5.89) 
-.007 
(0.00) 
 
Network*External Hire   .242 
(0.90) 
 
Experience*External Hire   -1.80 
(0.98) 
 
Teacher Salary .0003** 
(6.41) 
.0003** 
(7.13) 
.0003** 
(7.09) 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio -.117* 
(1.90) 
-.111* 
(1.82) 
-.111* 
(1.82) 
 
Revenue/Pupil -.0002 
(1.52) 
-.0001 
(1.27) 
-.0001 
(1.29) 
 
Constant 19.24** 
(11.96) 
17.21** 
(9.48) 
16.94** 
(9.17) 
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Table 3.1 continued 
Dependent Variable:  All Students 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
    
Observations 
 
R-squared 
2534 
 
.8086 
2534 
 
.8115 
2534 
 
.8116 
    
Adjusted R-squared .8080   .8106  .8105 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level
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Table 3.2 
The Long-Term Effect of Managerial Succession on Student Pass Rates 
 
Dependent Variable-All Student 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
Recovery 6.25** 
(21.60) 
6.26** 
(21.61) 
 
6.26** 
(21.52) 
Lagged Pass Rate .737** 
(5.40) 
.739** 
(5.10) 
 
.739** 
(5.09) 
% Black Students -.105** 
(4.07) 
-.103** 
(3.96) 
-.102** 
(3.94) 
% Hispanic Students -.047** 
(2.60) 
-.045** 
(2.49) 
 
-.045** 
(2.49) 
% Low-Income Students .075** 
(2.79) 
.076** 
(2.83) 
 
.076** 
(2.83) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -.031 
(0.50) 
-.029 
(0.47) 
 
-.027 
(0.45) 
Networking  -.352 
(1.38) 
-.217 
(0.69) 
 
Managerial Experience  -1.33 
(1.12) 
-1.39 
(0.98) 
 
External Hire  .324 
(0.41) 
-.008 
(0.00) 
 
Network*External Hire   -.407 
(0.98) 
 
Experience*External Hire   .354 
(0.14) 
 
Teacher Salary .0000 
(0.42) 
.0003 
(1.12) 
.0000 
(0.32) 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio .106 
(0.55) 
.101 
(0.52) 
.093 
(0.48) 
 
Revenue/Pupil -.0003 
(1.50) 
-.0003 
(1.52) 
-.0004 
(1.55) 
 
Constant 10.26* 
(1.80) 
11.44* 
(1.93) 
11.36* 
(1.89) 
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Table 3.2 continued 
Dependent Variable:  All Students 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
    
Observations 
 
R-squared 
541 
 
.5372 
541 
 
.5403 
541 
 
.5408 
    
Adjusted R-squared 
 
F-Test 
 
.5267 
 
23.84** 
.5272 
 
14.54** 
.5259 
 
14.23** 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level
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Table 3.3 
The Short-Term Effect of Managerial Succession on Dropout Rates 
 
Dependent Variable: All Student 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
Managerial Change -.066 
(1.12) 
-.073 
(1.23) 
 
-.074 
(1.24) 
Lagged Pass Rate -.026** 
(12.09) 
-.027** 
(12.25) 
 
-.027** 
(12.25) 
% Black Students .008** 
(3.49) 
.008** 
(3.50) 
.008** 
(3.48) 
 
% Hispanic Students .004** 
(2.55) 
.004** 
(2.60) 
 
.004** 
(2.59) 
% Low-Income Students .004** 
(2.44) 
.004** 
(2.26) 
 
.004** 
(2.25) 
% Non-Certified Teachers .007 
(1.51) 
.007 
(1.43) 
 
.006 
(1.44) 
Networking  -.008 
(0.41) 
-.010 
(0.45) 
 
Managerial Experience  .229 
(1.59) 
.196 
(1.22) 
 
External Hire  .115* 
(1.94) 
-.046 
(0.13) 
 
Network*External Hire   .008 
(0.15) 
 
Experience*External Hire   -.165 
(0.45) 
 
Teacher Salary .00003** 
(5.02) 
.00004** 
(4.81) 
.00004** 
(4.81) 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio .001 
(0.10) 
.001 
(0.11) 
.001 
(0.11) 
 
Revenue/Pupil -.0001** 
(5.33) 
-.0001** 
(5.37) 
-.0001** 
(5.36) 
 
Constant 1.87** 
(5.89) 
1.77** 
(4.91) 
1.81** 
(4.91) 
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Table 3.3 continued 
Dependent Variable:  All Students 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
    
Observations 
 
R-squared 
2514 
 
.1858 
2514 
 
.1878 
2514 
 
.1879 
    
Adjusted R-squared .1829   .1839  .1834 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level
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Table 3.4 
The Short-Term Effect of Managerial Succession on Percentage of Students in Gifted and Talented 
Classes 
 
Dependent Variable: All Student 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
Managerial Change .202 
(0.98) 
.199 
(0.97) 
 
.201 
(0.98) 
Lagged Pass Rate .041** 
(6.54) 
.041** 
(5.34) 
 
.041** 
(5.32) 
% Black Students -.005 
(0.68) 
-.005 
(0.78) 
-.005 
(0.77) 
 
% Hispanic Students -.005 
(1.12) 
-.005 
(1.11) 
 
-.005 
(1.08) 
% Low-Income Students .012** 
(2.00) 
.012* 
(1.94) 
 
.012* 
(1.91) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -.015 
(0.94) 
-.015 
(0.90) 
 
-.014 
(0.88) 
Networking  .195** 
(2.79) 
.159** 
(2.07) 
 
Managerial Experience  .057 
(0.12) 
.106 
(0.19) 
 
External Hire  -.101 
(0.49) 
.200 
(0.16) 
 
Network*External Hire   .203 
(1.12) 
 
Experience*External Hire   -.340 
(0.21) 
 
Teacher Salary -.00009** 
(2.99) 
-.00009** 
(2.85) 
.00009** 
(2.88) 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio .129** 
(3.11) 
.128** 
(3.08) 
.128** 
(3.08) 
 
Revenue/Pupil .0003** 
(3.71) 
-.0003** 
(3.67) 
-.0002** 
(3.66) 
 
Constant 3.80** 
(3.49) 
3.72** 
(3.01) 
3.73** 
(2.96) 
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Table 3.4 continued 
Dependent Variable:  All Students 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
    
Observations 
 
R-squared 
2534 
 
.0245 
2534 
 
.0277 
2534 
 
.0282 
    
Adjusted R-squared .0211   .0231  .0228 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level
  
79
 
 
Table 3.5 
The Short-Term Effect of Managerial Succession on Percent Daily Attendance 
 
Dependent Variable: All Student 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
Managerial Change .011 
(0.26) 
.023 
(0.55) 
 
.024 
(.056) 
Lagged Pass Rate .027** 
(17.41) 
.028** 
(17.93) 
 
.028** 
(17.94) 
% Black Students -.003* 
(1.87) 
-.003* 
(1.79) 
-.003** 
(1.78) 
 
% Hispanic Students .005** 
(5.45) 
.005** 
(5.37) 
 
.005** 
(5.38) 
% Low-Income Students -.009** 
(7.38) 
-.009** 
(6.94) 
 
-.009** 
(6.96) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -.016** 
(4.86) 
-.015** 
(4.71) 
 
-.016** 
(4.71) 
Networking  -.018 
(1.27) 
-.022 
(1.38) 
 
Managerial Experience  -.003 
(0.03) 
.009 
(0.08) 
 
External Hire  -.178** 
(4.19) 
-.108 
(0.42) 
 
Network*External Hire   .021 
(0.55) 
 
Experience*External Hire   -.072 
(0.27) 
 
Teacher Salary .00008** 
(12.44) 
-.00008** 
(11.91) 
-.00008** 
(11.92) 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio -.078** 
(9.06) 
-.077** 
(8.96) 
-.078** 
(8.96) 
 
Revenue/Pupil .00006** 
(4.24) 
.00006** 
(4.49) 
.0006** 
(4.28) 
 
Constant 97.60** 
(429.97) 
97.37** 
(378.70) 
97.36** 
(371.92) 
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Table 3.5 continued 
Dependent Variable:  All Students 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
    
Observations 
 
R-squared 
2534 
 
.3164 
2534 
 
.3214 
2534 
 
.3215 
    
Adjusted R-squared .3139   .3182  .3178 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level
  
81
 
 
Table 3.6 
The Short-Term Effect of Managerial Succession on Percentage of Students Who Scored above the 
1110 criterion on the SAT 
 
Dependent Variable: All Student 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
Managerial Change -.526 
(0.91) 
-.554 
(0.96) 
 
-.565 
(0.98) 
Lagged Pass Rate .232** 
(10.72) 
.228** 
(10.28) 
 
.228** 
(10.24) 
% Black Students .054** 
(2.47) 
.052** 
(2.40) 
.051** 
(2.36) 
 
% Hispanic Students .034** 
(2.40) 
.034** 
(2.43) 
 
.034** 
(2.44) 
% Low-Income Students -.209** 
(10.91) 
-.212** 
(10.97) 
 
-.212** 
(10.99) 
% Non-Certified Teachers -.041 
(0.87) 
-.040 
(0.86) 
 
-.039 
(0.86) 
Networking  .302 
(1.54) 
.248 
(1.15) 
 
Managerial Experience  -1.05 
(0.76) 
-1.71 
(1.12) 
 
External Hire  .329 
(0.56) 
-.313 
(0.88) 
 
Network*External Hire   .293 
(0.56) 
 
Experience*External Hire   3.55 
(0.98) 
 
Teacher Salary .0007** 
(7.26) 
.0007** 
(7.19) 
.0007** 
(7.20) 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio -.049 
(0.34) 
-.065 
(0.45) 
-.069 
(0.45) 
 
Revenue/Pupil -.0004* 
(1.80) 
-.0004** 
(1.92) 
-.0004** 
(1.94) 
 
Constant -8.51** 
(2.55) 
-6.69* 
(1.79) 
-5.92 
(1.56) 
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Table 3.6 continued 
Dependent Variable:  All Students 
Pass Rates 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
    
Observations 
 
R-squared 
2416 
 
.2914 
2416 
 
.2923 
2416 
 
.2987 
    
Adjusted R-squared .2914   .2888  .2886 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level
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Table 3.7 
Long-Term Effects of Change on Districts with Managerial Change vs. Districts 
with No Change in Management 
 
Note-Standard Errors in Parentheses 
**=Significant at the .05 level 
*=Significant at the .10 level 
DV: Long-term Pass Rate 
Change 
Model 1 
Succession 
 
6.18** 
(.349) 
 
Lagged Dependent Var. 
 
-.242** 
(.018) 
 
% Black Students 
 
-.044** 
(.014) 
 
% Hispanic Students 
 
-.025** 
(.008) 
 
% Low Income 
 
.003 
(.012) 
 
% Non-Certified Teachers 
 
-.064* 
(.034) 
 
Networking 
 
.142 
(.145) 
 
Experience 
 
-.672 
(1.06) 
 
Constant 
 
23.42** 
(1.90) 
  
N 2021 
F-test 14.14** 
Adjusted R-Squared .2331 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION AND THE INFLUENCE OF HIERARCHY: 
 
HOW THE BRITISH FARE 
 
 
Work division is the foundation of organization; 
 indeed, the reason for organization. 
Luther Gulick, 1937 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the theoretical discussion and the empirical analysis 
showed evidence that public management and management succession does indeed, have 
a small, albeit significant effect on organizational performance. That empirical work 
however, is restricted to only one type of organization, namely school districts.  While 
school districts provide an excellent laboratory for empirical studies, they are limited in 
one aspect that may be skewing our view of the impact managers have on performance.  
School districts, as independent authorities, are all generally structured the same; they 
are relatively flat hierarchies.  We see that in flat hierarchies, managers influence 
performance, but what about vertical or rigid hierarchies?  Could it be the structure of 
the organization that in part, determines if the manager can truly influence performance?   
In this analysis, we will test the same theory of public managerial succession, 
namely, that succession affects performance, but will test it using a much more rigid 
hierarchy, with public education authorities in Great Britain.  The British bureaucracy 
differs from the US bureaucracy in two key ways.  The British system is more 
hierarchical, decreasing each manager’s span of control, and the system is more rigid, 
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removing discretion from the manager’s position.   I link these differences to 
organizational performance by looking at the theoretical expectations of Gulick’s (1937) 
notion of span of control and Weber’s (1946) ideal-type bureaucracy, particularly as it 
relates to managerial succession. 
 
Hierarchy 
 Hierarchy permeates nearly every aspect of our public and private lives.  The 
public schools that our children attend are hierarchical.  The organization that 
manufactures the vehicles we drive is hierarchical.  Indeed, even our own nuclear family 
unit is a hierarchy!27  Thus, recognizing the role of hierarchy in analyzing the role of 
public management is fundamental to a discussion of performance. A great many works 
have been penned and many scholars have opined on the relative merits of hierarchy in 
an attempt to determine its utility and necessity.  Arguments range from Weber (1946) 
and Taylor (1911) to Coase (1937 and 1960) and Miller (1992). Taylor, the father of 
scientific management, viewed hierarchy as a means for dealing with the mechanistic 
problems of organizational controls. Hierarchy and management are used as the system 
of rewards and punishment used for shaping subordinate behavior. Coase, on the other 
hand, viewed the firm as a mechanism for encouraging the entrepreneurial spirit. He 
claims that hierarchical direction, not voluntaristic market transactions, secure the 
                                                          
27 Notice that the reference to the nuclear family as hierarchical is gender-neutral.  In my family, for 
example, even though I sit atop the hierarchy, my perch is akin to that of the British monarch, where I 
yield mostly ceremonial authority.  My dear wife allows for this scenario because she manages and 
manipulates the affairs of the family without much concern of intrusion from me.  It is also likely that I’m 
the figurehead because of my strikingly good looks. 
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existence of the firm.  The vast majority of scholarship on hierarchies, however, agrees 
that its functions are to reduce uncertainty and increase control.  His argument is that 
negotiating prices for every transaction is too costly to the firm, thus the hierarchy and 
entrepreneurs within it reduce those costs.  Miller (1992) views organizations as two 
separate entities; first as incentive systems that reward selfish employees for working 
toward organizational goals, and second as organic systems which succeed through 
leadership.  As he attempts to reconcile these competing camps, he argues that both 
approaches are needed to understand hierarchies. 
Indeed, hierarchy may be defined utilizing Miller’s (1992, 16) definition as, “the 
asymmetric and incompletely defined authority of one actor to direct the activities of 
another within certain bounds.” Miller’s definition captures the application of hierarchy 
in public organizations as applied to performance, as this study of managerial succession 
implies, and indeed, hopes to test, namely how one actor can influence another in an 
attempt to affect organizational performance.  Furthermore, speaking more esoterically, 
how do varying degrees of hierarchy affect an actor’s ability to influence another actor? 
Clearly, managers are constrained to some extent by their environment, and we generally 
assume that some degree of managerial skill or ability will overcome those constraints.  
But what if it can’t?  What if organizational structure is so constraining that managerial 
skill is hindered by the environment?  This is precisely why a test of managers in like 
organizations with vastly different hierarchical rules is germane to any examination of 
managerial effects.   
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Span of Control 
The term, “span of control” is related to the organization or structure of 
relationships between superiors and subordinates (Gulick, 1937).  The more subordinates 
a manager oversees, the wider the span of control.  As the span of control widens, 
superiors must delegate some decision-making authority to subordinates in order to free 
themselves of the informational bog that comes with large organizations.  Delegation of 
authority, while significantly reducing the costs of information gathering down the 
hierarchy, significantly decreases the superior’s ability to oversee and influence all 
aspects of performance. 
On the other hand, a narrow span of control should result in more direct 
authority.  With fewer subordinates, the manager should be more likely to be able to 
influence the behavior of their subordinates. For example, it is easier to monitor the 
behavior of subordinates as oversight costs are lower due simply to the lack of 
subordinates needing to be overseen.  Furthermore, information asymmetry will be 
reduced.  With a narrow span of control, it is not as necessary for the superior to delegate 
information or decision-making authority to subordinates.  Because the superior retains 
most of the managerial authority in situations with a narrow span, the subordinates are 
easier to control. The expectation then, is this increase in managerial control results in 
more of the organization’s functions becoming dependent on each individual manager.  
By extension, we would then predict that each change in manager would cause a shift in 
the organization’s performance.   
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 This would lead to the expectation that managerial succession would matter more 
in the British system than in the US.  However, the increase in hierarchical structure 
(decreased span of control) is also paired with an increasingly value-free bureaucracy.  
(Coxall and Robins 1994).  Of course, this leads to dramatically different expectations.  
If bureaucrats, and more importantly, managers work in a system that promotes a culture 
of cog-like technocrats, we would not expect individual managers to matter much as 
value free implementation implies adherence to rules and a lack of “leadership” in terms 
of innovation and individuality in the carrying out of managerial duties. Indeed, Coxall 
and Robins (1994) note that the context of British politics promotes Weber’s notion of 
authority as legal-rational, or in other words, authority to do one’s job rests in the belief 
in rules and laws sanctioned by democratic government. This view is in opposition to the 
notion that some American scholars might consider to be the charismatic leadership, to 
coin another of Weber’s “types” of authority, which permeates good managers in the US 
context.28 This would lead us to very different expectations about the effect of 
managerial succession.  In a legal-rational system, changing managers should not 
significantly affect performance.  
  Because the British system is both more rigid and more hierarchical, this analysis 
will consider how these differences affect the relationship between succession and 
performance.  First, I offer a review of the British system, and then discuss the two 
                                                          
28 The scholars that I refer to are Robert Behn (1991, 1988) and those that adhere to the notion that 
individual characteristics make good leaders.  This is different from arguing that management affects 
organizational performance.  There does not need to be the normative qualification attached to 
management that is attached to good, charismatic leadership, or the “best practices” literature that we find 
in many studies of management. 
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bodies of literature that offer these competing expectations.  I then test for the effect of 
managerial succession using data from the UK local education authorities.  
 
British Government 101 
 Because I expect the majority of people reading this to be less familiar with the 
UK system, I will offer a brief review of aspects of British government that are 
important for this analysis.  The United Kingdom is a parliamentary democracy, as well 
as a constitutional monarchy in which the ministers of the Crown govern in the name of 
the Sovereign.  The Parliament functions as the supreme authority in government and 
law making.  The Queen, as the monarch, is the head of the executive and judiciary, as 
well as commander-in-chief of the British Royal Forces and supreme governor of the 
Church of England.  She holds little influence in Parliament, aside from the ability to 
dissolve it, at the behest of the Prime Minister.29  The Queen’s role, then, is primarily the 
Head of State, although officially she is still the Head of the Government.   The central 
government functions without a constitution.  Rather, it is governed via statute law, 
common law, and conventions.  Legislative authority and power is centered in the House 
of Commons, specifically with the Prime Minister, who is chosen by the majority party 
and appointed by the Queen as the head of the functioning government.   
 The bureaucratic structure in the United Kingdom is close to an example of true 
hierarchy.  The Prime Minister is the head of government.  He or she chooses a cabinet  
                                                          
29 This power is unlikely to be exercised as the Prime Minister is head of the majority party. 
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of about 20 members. Members are chosen from the majority party and may or may not 
have a particular specialization in the department for which they are tapped.  This 
appointee to the cabinet is referred to as the Minister, for example, the Minister of 
Education or the Minister of Defense.  The Minister oversees the actions of the 
Department Secretary.  Career bureaucrats traditionally fill these positions. 
 As depicted in Figure 4.1, the link between local authorities and the central 
government is through the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, who is responsible for 
housing, planning, regional and local government, and fire service (The Municipal 
Yearbook 2000).  
Figure 4.1 
United Kingdom Government Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cabinet Deputy Prime 
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Ministers 
Local Authorities 
(Councils) 
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Parliament 
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Prime Minister 
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In the United Kingdom, where the data for this analysis originate, the local 
governments are organized into three councils.  First, the County Councils are 
responsible for the following areas of government-strategic planning, highways, traffic, 
social services, education, libraries, fires, refuse disposal and consumer protection.  The 
second council of government, the District Councils, (which works in tandem with the 
County Council) is responsible for local planning, housing, environmental health, 
cemeteries and crematoria, leisure services and parks, tourism, and electoral registration.  
The third and final council is the London and Metropolitan councils, which are unitary 
and run all of the services in those particular areas (The Municipal Yearbook 2000). 
 Ultimate decision-making authority rests on the elected councils.  The elected 
councils, whether they are County or District councils, are the principals, who work 
within a committee structure.  In principle, all major policy decisions and actions are 
made in committee (with recommendations going to the full council), which includes the 
appointment of Directors of Education. 
 Funding for each local authority (and department in that authority) is designated 
by Parliament through central grants. With the exception of the Council Tax, (which is 
primarily a property tax and can be capped by the Central government) local authorities 
are not at liberty to levy taxes, or have any other means of raising funds for public 
education.  Their fiduciary responsibility, and hence, accountability, is to Parliament, 
centralizing the authority and discretion of the local Director of Education. 
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British Politics 
Winston Churchill said, “We have the strongest Parliament in the world. We 
have the oldest, the most famous, the most secure, and the most serviceable monarchy in 
the world. King and Parliament both rest safely and solidly upon the will of the people 
expressed by free and fair election on the basis of universal suffrage.  Thus, the system 
has long worked harmoniously, both in peace and in war” (address to the House of 
Commons, 1945 [Wright 2003]).  Indeed, Churchill is accurate in his description of 
British government.  The British legislative structure of representative government vis-à-
vis Parliament and the Monarchy has solid roots and lends itself to a convenient 
discussion of hierarchical relationships, in that it does not cumber itself with the checks-
and-balance system we are so familiar with in the United States.  The structure of 
“Crown-in-Parliament” government that Britain employs is an arrangement that is top-
down rather than bottom-up, allowing the government to govern (Wright 2003). Surely, 
it is an executive-dominated political system. The degree of Britain’s top-down polity 
makes it unusual among modern democracies. According to Wright (2003), top-down, or 
unified politics provides the shortest link between the represented and the representative, 
and he argues that the British believe this system is the best in terms of representative 
and bureaucratic accountability. 30  The top-down relationship is important in this study 
as we compare the federal system in the United States with the Parliamentary system in 
the United Kingdom.  
                                                          
30 Wright (2003) asserts that the top-down polity is one of Britain’s defining political characteristics.  If 
Wright is correct (he provides no evidence for this assertion, however), then Britain is an excellent 
contradiction to the U.S. system of federalism and bottom-up politics.   
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The federal system, or fragmented system that the United States operates under, 
is a constitutionally mandated system with constitutional checks and institutional 
powers, often leading to deliberate and sometimes, fractious politics.  Political problems 
are often slow in being resolved, if they are resolved at all.  It is not so in the United 
Kingdom.  With all of the decision-making authority concentrated in the legislative 
body, namely Parliament, the majority party can have its way, making policy without 
any check on its validity or constitutionality (which would be impossible as the U.K. has 
no written constitution). The rule of law is grounded in the tradition of common law and 
judiciary independence as the protectors of liberty. While some might fear corruption or 
tyranny under such a regime, others might claim the government is, indeed, more 
responsive to the citizenry than regimes with checks and balances.  The British refer to 
their system of centralized and concentrated power as “strong government” (Coxall and 
Robins 1994; Wright 2003).  
 
British Local Government 
British local governments, or “authorities,” are designated by geography and/or 
population.  They are akin in that respect to city governments, but differ in that they 
have little or no revenue-generating authority.   
Understanding the local government structure in the United Kingdom requires 
some understanding of the perceived role of the local governments with relation to the 
national government.  Local government in the UK can be perceived in one of two ways.  
The first perception of British local authorities is that they are the functioning arm of the 
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national government (Stewart 2000).  The role of the local authority is seen as an agent, 
providing goods and services at the behest of the national government. Stewart claims 
that, “Because there is no written constitution, local authorities derive their position 
solely from legislation.   They have been set up by statute and could be abolished by 
statute…These conditions support an assumption of hierarchy in the relationship (2000, 
90-91).”31 The opposite perception of the local authorities is that they are seen as 
political institutions in and of themselves for local choice.  In the latter case, the local 
authority should be afforded considerably more autonomy and decision-making 
authority in terms of both the influence of local managers as well as the ability to levy 
and spend local taxes than in the former case as they are making localized policy 
decisions (Stewart 2000).   
Most scholars now believe, however, that the pendulum has swung back in the 
direction of local authorities as agents for the national government, and it is under this 
assumption that we outline the structure and duties of local authorities.  By defining the 
structure and duties of British local authorities in the rigid hierarchy within which they 
operate, we are able to determine if the impact of managers on organizational 
performance is a function of managerial manipulation of the structure and environment, 
as the Texas school district model implies, or whether managerial impact is minimized 
by a highly centralized organizational structure. 
                                                          
31 The one caveat to Stewart’s assertion on the legitimacy of local authorities is that the Labor government 
ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government, stating, “the principle of local self-government 
shall be recognized in domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution” (Council of Europe, 
1985, Article 2). Notwithstanding the signing of the Charter, Stewart is adamant that because there is no 
written constitution, there is no formal foundations for local authorities. 
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 Local government in the United Kingdom functions through a committee 
structure. Committees are derived of members of the unitary or county council, who 
govern and legislate at the local level. There is no separate executive, such as a mayor, 
that you see in the United States local government context.32  All executive business is 
conducted through the council and the committees.  Committees oversee the actions of 
the chief officers, who are responsible for departmental performance.   
 The nitty-gritty workings of local authorities have rested with the professional 
principal (Stewart 2000).  For example, lawyers filled all of the local clerk positions, 
professional engineers fill the engineering positions, and professional educators fill the 
education positions, and so forth.  The British model of professionalism argues that 
professionalism is a source of stability in knowledge that is required to implement 
legislation (Robson 1931).  Professionals bring expertise and certification, standards, and 
safeguards associated with professional memberships.  They bring legitimacy to 
bureaucracy. 
 Local authorities are divided into departments responsible for the provision of 
services.  At the head of each department is a chief officer.  The chief officer is the 
department’s voice.  He or she is responsible for reporting to the council and 
committees, as well as to be the face to the outside world (Stewart 2000).  In a sense, the 
chief officer holds a very powerful position in local and national government, and prior 
to the 1974 and 1975 reforms, was afforded quite a bit of autonomy.  It is easy to see 
                                                          
32 In some British cities, mayors and lord mayors do exist, but they are an artifact of bygone systems and 
are now largely a ceremonial position in nature with no formal decision-making authority (Coxall and 
Robins, 1994). 
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that, at the time of the reforms, power needed to be centralized because of the very 
nature of the local authority; the lack of checks on individual power by these chief 
officers.  Longer-tenured officers were gaining more and more power and becoming 
more autonomous in their decision-making.  The reforms of 1974-1975 centralized 
authority at the national level. Centralizing authority reduced the autonomy of long-
tenured chief officers, which allowed for standardization of service provision across 
local authorities, so that for example, county councils in all local authorities are 
responsible for education and libraries as opposed for education and libraries to be under 
the purview of county councils in some authorities and district councils in others. (See 
Figure 4.2.) 
 In short, British local government can be summed up as follows: “Local 
authorities have been organized for direct control of services, enforced by organizational 
hierarchies, seeking uniformity of policy and practice” (Stewart 2000, 48).  Local 
authorities in the Parliamentary system of Britain appear to be a dependent arm of the 
central government that resemble more the bureaucratic structure in the United States 
rather than the autonomous self-governing units of states, counties and cities.  Indeed, 
the rigid hierarchy of the British system affords a much different structure than the loose 
hierarchy of the U.S. system, which will surely have an effect on the chief executive’s 
ability to influence performance. 
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Figure 4.2 
Local Government in the United Kingdom 
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Theoretical Expectations 
Two competing theories in the literature emerge of the influence of hierarchy on 
managers’ ability to influence organizational performance. The first theory stems from 
Luther Gulick’s (1937) notion of span of control and the second is the Weberian 
approach (1946).  These competing theories of hierarchical influence can lead to 
dissenting views of managerial effect on organizational performance.   
 Span of control argues that increasing the hierarchical structure reduces the span 
of control (Gulick, 1937; Meier and Bohte, 2000 and 2003; Hammond, 1990; 
Woodward, 1980; Holden, Pederson, and Germane, 1968; Hood and Dunshire, 1981; 
Carzo and Yanouzas, 1969; Brehm and Gates, 1997).  Gulick’s classic theory is based on 
efficiency; its two prime elements are differentiation of function and coordination of 
responsibility.  Meier and Bohte (2000) add, “Span of control dictates that superiors 
should oversee a limited number of subordinates rather than a large number of 
subordinates. Monitoring and mentoring the work of subordinates is a less daunting task 
when the number of subordinates is small, but becomes more difficult when superiors 
are charged with overseeing a large number of individuals” (Meier and Bohte 2000, 
116). A narrow span of control increases the amount of influence the superior can have 
on the subordinate, thus increasing the effect of the manager on the performance of the 
organization. In other words, narrow spans of control increase the monitoring 
capabilities of the superior and decreases subordinate shirking (Brehm and Gates 1997).  
The expectation, then, is that managerial succession in this hierarchical framework 
would affect the performance of the organization. 
  
99
 
 Conversely, Weber’s notion of bureaucracy as an impersonal structure designed 
to maximize efficiency and “the vital interest of everyone concerned” (Weber 1946, 
229), led Blau and Meyer (1971) to imply that increasing the levels in the hierarchy 
leads to bureaucratic values, standard operating procedures, and cultural norms, each of 
which are designed to reduce the discretion of any individual in the hierarchy, 
effectively making them interchangeable cogs in the organizational wheel. Indeed, 
Weber’s treatment of the position of the official in a bureaucracy introduces many of the 
notions that would insinuate a minimization of individuality and unique managerial 
strategy in the bureaucracy. Weber says, “Entrance into an office…is considered an 
acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management I return for a secure 
existence. It is decisive for the specific nature of modern loyalty to an office that, in the 
pure type, it does not establish relationship to a person, like the vassal’s or disciple’s 
faith in feudal or in patrimonial relations of authority. Modern loyalty is devoted to 
impersonal and functional purposes” (1946, 199). Weber can not be clearer on his 
concept of the position of the official in that its authority and individuality is subsumed 
into the office, not the individual.  It would stand then, that in a traditional tall hierarchy 
that managers may not be able to influence performance. Weber himself argued that 
obedience by subordinates rests on the legitimacy of the system of authority. “The 
official duty…is fixed by rationally established norms, by enactments, decrees, and 
regulations, in such a manner that the legitimacy of the authority becomes the legality of 
the general rule, which is purposely thought out, enacted, and announced with formal 
correctness” (Weber 1946, 299).  If, as Weber argues, that bureaucracies are designed to 
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be impersonal and authority is housed in the formal rules and regulations, and Blau and 
Meyer’s argument of increasing levels of hierarchy reduce discretion, then it stands that 
in Weber’s conceptualization of a bureaucracy, individual managers, or any actor within 
the bureaucracy, would have little overall impact indeed. 
Clearly, Weber’s ideal-type bureaucracy with its rational-legal authority provides 
managers with little ability to influence performance vis-à-vis personal strengths or 
abilities. In fact, Robert Merton, in his classic essay, “Bureaucratic Structure and 
Personality,” goes so far as to argue that, “Authority, the power of control which derives 
from an acknowledged  status, inheres in the office and not in the particular person who 
performs the official role” (1957, 195) [Italics added]. We are likely to see little, if any, 
affect on performance when managers in this hierarchical framework are replaced, as the 
majority of the autonomy is housed in the top levels of the hierarchy and the 
organizational structure, if we believe Merton and Weber.  This does not allow for 
discretion.  
Juxtaposed against the span of control argument, in the discretion argument 
based on Weber’s model, shirking would be greater for two reason; because the 
hierarchical structure , thus managerial control and influence would be less. The 
likelihood of a succession event having any significant impact in such a structure would 
be small, indeed. 
This chapter intends to test the validity of these arguments to determine if 
management and structure are related, and if management matters at all.  We have seen 
in prior tests that managers influence performance, and managerial succession affects 
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performance.  Many of those tests have been constrained to a flaccid hierarchy (school 
districts), while this treatment will approach the question using a similar organization 
with similar goals, albeit a different organizational structure.  I employ public education 
authorities in Great Britain, which are rich in hierarchy as they reach all the way to the 
central government. 
 
Hypotheses 
 As specified throughout the previous discussion, this paper will test two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis One: Due to the hierarchical nature of the education system and the 
decreased span of control, managerial succession should lead to a shift in 
organizational performance. 
Hypothesis Two: Because of the Weberian-like norms held by bureaucrats in the 
UK, succession events should have little disruptive effect on educational performance. 
 These hypotheses, of course, present a no-lose situation as they offer opposing 
views, but are sequentially designed to test the notion of structure and management.  
Clearly, from hypothesis one, structure would advance the manager’s ability to influence 
the agency’s performance.  Conversely, hypothesis two would surely indicate that 
structure would hinder managerial influence.  If hypothesis two proves to be 
substantiated, it may be necessary for us to explore our concept of management more 
thoroughly. 
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Data and Methods 
Unlike the autonomy that Texas school superintendents enjoy, British directors 
of education are mired deep within an organizational hierarchy.  While both British 
school districts and Texas school districts are public agencies, the context surrounding 
each is quite different. The dataset to be employed is from British local education 
authorities.  While the United States has a highly decentralized system of government, 
the British system is decidedly centralized, and the school authorities are no different.  
By including the British data we are able to compare managers from flat systems (U.S. 
superintendents) to those from hierarchical systems (British directors of education).  The 
time series in this dataset is 1996-2001.  The units of analysis are British local education 
authorities (LEAs) (the equivalent to a district in the U.S.).  The managers are the 
Directors of Education.   See page 108 for descriptive statistics. 
 
Dependent Variables   
The data include five performance indicators, representing what the British 
education system has designated as important measures of student progress and success.  
Students in the UK are administered topical exams in grade 11 that are used to determine 
which students qualify for college33 (also termed “six form”).  Each exam is graded on a 
scale where all minimally passing scores range from A to G, with a C score considered  
 
                                                          
33 College (or six-form) refers to the two years between compulsory school years (through grade 11) and 
entering a university.   
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to be the threshold for a reasonable level of subject mastery.  Students who score A-C on 
five of these exams are considered by the British system to be “college-ready.” 
The analysis includes the percentage of the students in grade 11 (all of whom 
take these exams) who reached the college-ready threshold, as previously defined.  Also 
included are two low-end achievement measures:  the percentage of tested students who 
scored A-G (minimal pass) on at least five exams and the percentage of tested students 
who failed all exams. 
The education system in the UK has also begun to crack down on absenteeism, 
levying larger fines and even jail time for truancy.  Because the UK education system 
has deemed attendance important, we also include this in our analysis.  The measure 
included here is the percentage of classes missed at the LEA level. 
 
Independent Variables 
For the British data, the independent variables are similar to the Texas school 
district data, namely, managerial succession.  The exception is that we can only analyze 
the short term affect as the control variables for any long-term analysis are not available.  
In an attempt to remain consistent, I tried to develop independent variables and controls  
that would mirror those in the Texas school district study.  
The independent variable of interest is managerial succession.  The original data 
reported the name of each director of education for each LEA for each year.  Change 
was coded as a “1” if the LEA’s director was replaced in the previous year.  For  
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example, a change in director in 1996 would be linked to the 1997 outcomes.  The 
change was only noted for the year in which the change occurred. 
Unfortunately, the UK’s Department of Education and Skills does not have as 
rich data as does the US Department of Education, which led to some limitation in the 
ability to control for LEA characteristics.  In an attempt to control for LEA wealth, I 
include measures of per pupil expenditures and student-teacher ratios.  Also included as 
a control variable is a measure of LEA size -- total number of students -- calculated by 
combining the student/teacher ratio the number of full-time equivalent teachers. 
 
Methodology 
 These data are analyzed the same way the data in the other chapters are analyzed, 
namely, using fixed-effect least squares analysis, controlling for the variation that can be 
attributed to yearly fluctuations.  Controlling for yearly fluctuations results in more 
conservative estimates, but I felt it was necessary in this analysis.  I also ran these 
numbers with a lagged dependent variable, but did not include these results, a decision 
that will be discussed later. 
 
Results 
Using the findings to answer the basic question, “Does managerial succession 
affect organizational outcomes in the UK?” produces strong support for saying no.  With 
all five performance indicators, the change variable is insignificant.   In fact, the average 
t-score for the change variable is 0.59, a far cry from the conventionally-accepted level 
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of 1.96 (see tables 4.2 and 4.3).  As mentioned above, running the data with a lagged 
dependent variable in the model also produces five insignificant coefficients.  Just to be 
absolutely sure, a third test was run, offering the change variable its best chance at 
achieving significance by taking out the fixed effects, and, although we saw a small 
jump in the t-scores, all five indicators were once again insignificant.  In the end, we 
have no reason to support rejecting the null hypothesis. 
The control variables proved to be even more disappointing that was expected.  
The R-squares range from .02 to .34, with an average of .20.  Although this gives some 
idea that the models are picking up something, a good portion of that can be attributed to 
the fixed effects.  Per pupil expenditures were negative and significant for three 
performance indicators, which was not expected given that this measure is one of the 
most reliable (and always positive) predicators of student achievement in the US.  For 
the other two indicators, the expenditures measure is positive and significant, though 
substantively quite small.  The student/teacher ratio, which should be negatively related 
to performance, is insignificant for four indicators, and positive and significant for one 
other.  Finally, the measure of LEA produced no significant findings. 
 
Conclusion 
 One of the few findings that offer a consistent story across performance 
indicators is that managerial change does not seem to affect educational performance in 
the UK.  Although the increase in hierarchy leads to the expectation that managers to 
have more of an effect, the rigid structure and culture of the British bureaucracy seems 
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to “trump” any effects that a reduced span of control might bring.  Changing LEA 
directors does not seem to affect educational performance either for the most salient 
policy outcomes (college-readiness, attendance) nor the relatively ignored ones (minimal 
passes, average points) (see Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). 
 This leads to a number of questions concerning the literature on public 
management.  In the quest to answer the question “Does management matter?” to what 
extent have we only asked if management matters in the US? Forbes and Lynn (2005) 
and Hill and Lynn (2004) do meta-analyses of US and non-US, or what they term 
“international” public management studies and find that while most international studies 
are investigating similar problems, they approach the research design in a much more 
linear fashion while the American research is predominantly from a governance 
perspective.34 Are these differences substantive differences in theory-building in public 
management? What if a system is designed so that managers cannot make a difference?   
 There is an alternative hypothesis to explain the impact of management in the 
British organizations.  It is conceivable that it is not the structure, per se, that is 
influencing the results, but that organizational survival is one plausible explanation.  The 
British bureaucracy has been in existence for a very long time, thus, the bureaucracy is, 
in a sense, become very routine, or fixed, and has potentially reached a level of “the 
ideal manager.” In other words, the British bureaucracy, over time, has honed and 
refined the position of public manager to the point of nearly reaching its ideal stage. 
                                                          
34 Hill and Lynn (2004) evaluate over 800 American empirical studies to determine the nature of the 
research design they employ, while Forbes and Lynn (2005) evaluate 193 American and international 
publications to draw the conclusions that I stated in the text. 
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Indeed, if we think of it in terms of a nonlinear curve where managerial skill has an 
“ideal” capacity, we can hypothesize that the British bureaucracy has very nearly 
reached that ideal type based primarily upon the notion that they have had a lot of time 
to develop their ideal manager. The bureaucracy can then change managers in and out of 
this role without much disruption, as the role is well established and managers are likely 
being trained to fit into that role.  The US system is still in the process of developing the 
“ideal manager” and as such, is on the upward slope of the curve.  Thus, while the 
American bureaucracy is in the process of developing its “ideal manager” there is greater 
variation in organizational outcomes as multiple managerial types are defining their 
roles. Over a very long period of time, the US bureaucracy can reach this ideal skill 
level, at which point, managerial succession in the US context would likely mirror that 
of the British.  I do not intend to test this hypothesis here, but to present it as an 
alternative and an avenue for future research. 
Regarding the question of public management, more specifically managerial 
succession, we can see that a very different bureaucratic regime resulted both in 
unexpected findings and interesting new questions for research.  The literature on 
managerial succession and the tests of public management theories in other contexts 
offer two fruitful avenues for new research. 
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Table 4.1 
  Descriptive Statistics:  Education 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev.
Percentage Considered College Ready 44.84 21 77 8.90
Percentage with Minimum Pass on 5 Exams 88.41 77 100 4.36
Percentage Failing All GSCE Exams 5.90 0 20 2.64
Average Score on Exams 3629 2480 5280 29.91
Percentage of Classes Missed (Unauthorized) 1.31 0 4 .066
Per Pupil Spending 3634.13 2990 5730 539.38
Student/Teacher Ratio 16.92 8.4 24 1.21
Total Students 55049.67 225 325653 43808.31
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Table 4.2 
 Testing the Effect of Managerial Succession on High-End Performance 
 
 
 College-Ready Average Points 
Managerial Change      -0.348      (0.34)35
     -18.040 
       (0.39) 
 
Per Pupil Funding -0.006(7.93)
-0.254 
(7.11) 
 
Student/Teacher Ratio 0.065(0.14)
8.134 
(0.39) 
 
Total Students 0.013(1.43)
0.443 
(1.10) 
 
Constant 67.634(7.28)
4383.46 
(10.36) 
  
Observations 410 410 
R-squared 0.19 0.34 
Adjusted R-squared  
 
 
 
                                                          
35 T-scores reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4.3 
  Testing the Effect of Managerial Succession on Low-End Performance 
 
 
 
Minimum Pass No Pass Attendance
Managerial Change 
 
-0.374
(0.81)
0.170 
(0.60) 
-0.053
 (0.81)
  
Per Pupil Funding -0.003(7.33)
0.000 
(1.69) 
0.001
(12.47)
  
Student/Teacher Ratio 0.169(0.81)
-0.139 
(1.09) 
0.057
(1.94)
  
Total Students 0.000(0.04)
-0.001 
(0.27) 
0.000
(0.10)
  
Constant 95.835(22.84)
6.276 
(2.45) 
-1.912
(3.23)
  
Observations 410 410 410
R-squared 0.16 0.02 0.30
Adjusted R-squared  
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 CHAPTER V 
THE EFFECT OF FREQUENT MANAGERIAL TURNOVER ON 
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE: 
A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL MANAGERS 
 
 Managing is getting paid for home runs someone else hit. 
Casey Stengel, 1890-1975 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyzes a manager’s contribution to the organization, particularly 
in terms of uncertainty related to managerial succession.  I test data compiled from 
baseball teams over a 24-year period in order to determine what effect managerial 
succession has on organizational performance, and if the frequency of succession events 
affects the performance of the organization. 
This chapter builds upon the theory of managerial succession by testing the 
frequency of executive succession.  As I explained in the previous chapters, the 
relatively few years of data available for both the Texas school district data and the 
British school district data do not provide ample time to test organizations that have 
multiple succession events over time.  Is there a “grace period” in which a new manager 
is allowed to fledge along before the organization makes another managerial change?  
Do organizations that change managers more often suffer lower performance, or are 
frequent changes invigorating to the line workers?  Is stability, as O’Toole and Meier 
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(2003) argue, one of the defining and desirable characteristics of bureaucratic 
organizations?  This chapter sets out to answer these questions by using data from Major 
League Baseball, from 1979-2003.   
The analysis in this chapter differs from the other two analyses in two distinct 
ways.  First, and most obvious, baseball managers are not public managers. However, 
public managers and baseball managers really aren’t that different (Grusky 1963; 
Gamson and Scotch 1964; Allen, Panian, and Lotz 1979).  Both are charged with 
producing results that are above the expected norm with the resources they have.  
Generally speaking, baseball players sign contracts with owners, independent of on-the-
field managers.  Civil servants have rights and protections that exist regardless of who 
manages them.  Furthermore, neither baseball managers nor public managers have 
unilateral authority to fire their subordinates.  In both baseball and the public sector, 
managers are in part hired and fired by the results of their subordinates.  In both cases 
certain managers tend to be more sought after than others are.   
Second, the tests using the baseball data are only addressing issues of internal 
management.  This is an important distinction, particularly in terms of the ability, or 
inability, to test for networking.  Much of the earlier analysis in this dissertation has 
centered on the influence of network on performance.  Although the empirical analysis 
provides little evidence that networking is affected as a consequence of succession, or 
that networking helps to soften the blow, it is still a theoretically viable discussion.  
However, a theory of baseball managers and networking differs slightly from the theory 
of public managers and networking.  In other words, baseball managers are not likely to 
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rely on other managers, professional organizations, and community elites to influence 
their performance; these duties are likely to be more applicable at the general manager, 
or appointed official-level.  The general manager of a baseball organization is 
traditionally responsible for filling the seats in the stadium, working television and radio 
relations, as well dealing with professional organizations such as the players’ union and 
the umpires’ union. A test for the effects of networks on influencing performance, then, 
is not theoretically appropriate or necessary for this analysis.  This chapter will focus 
solely on the effect of succession on the new manager’s influence on the internal 
structure, or the runs scored by the team and the number of games the team wins. 
 
Management Literature 
Most of the management literature has been discussed previously in the 
dissertation; however, I will add a few brief comments here. The study of public 
managers is not new. Wilson said in 1887, “It is the object of administrative study to 
discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it 
can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible 
cost either of money or of energy” (1887,197).  Wilson establishes early in the study of 
public administration the importance of management and the role it plays in 
governmental provision of services. Wilson, Weber and Taylor all insinuate that 
organizations are rational in the sense that they are rules-driven and predictable.  Taylor 
further describes organizations as having the potential to efficiently produce the product. 
Managing them, it can be argued, is a rational, machine-like task.  As theories on 
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organizational management evolve however, the rational management theory has 
evolved into more non-rational, fluid management, suggesting that managers have 
discretion in the way they supervise their organization (Morgan, 1998; Denhardt, 2000).  
The less rigid view of management gives managers the opportunity to be more 
responsive in their provision of services.  It is important to the organization as well as to 
society as a whole that the government develops ways to provide services effectively and 
efficiently.  Jreisat says, “The capacity of a society to manage its public policies and 
programs, not only effectively and efficiently but also fairly and creatively, defines most 
fundamental characteristics of such a society” (1997, 191).   
 
Justification 
The primary concern of this chapter is to test the impact of managers on the 
organizational performance, particularly in the context of change.  While other chapters 
have addressed aspects such as short and long-term effects and organizational constraints 
on performance, this chapter will look specifically at the frequency of executive 
succession and its effects on performance. The time frame required to run an analysis of 
multiple succession events in multiple organizations over time requires a database that 
exceeds the ability of either the Texas school data or the British school data. As such, I 
rely on data from Major League Baseball managers and organizations. The data covers a 
span of 24 years, from 1979-2003, with 26 teams, providing 650 observable years. While 
I am aware that baseball managers are not public servants, the baseball metaphor and 
sports in general is often used when discussing management and managers.  Although 
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baseball is a complex, private sector entity, my intent is to test a manger’s contribution 
to performance in the event of managerial turnover, and the use of baseball numbers can 
be readily generalized to both the private and public sectors.     
This study is not the first attempt to use baseball (or other sports) as a conduit for 
the application of public managerial questions.  Grusky (1963) used baseball managers 
to explain the affects of managerial succession on organizational effectiveness.  He 
explains, “Baseball teams and, in fact, most professional sports clubs offer the research 
advantages of public records of team personnel and team performance” (1963, 22).  This 
advantage is great in the public sector because, if the goal is to most effectively test a 
manager’s contribution to his or her organization, it is vital to employ data that can be 
compared over long periods of time and against other organizations with the same goals.  
“The structure of baseball organizations is such that ultimate responsibility for the 
performance of the team is almost always fixed on one position, that of field manager.  
At the same time, official authority is generally concentrated in this position” (Grusky 
1963).  While it may not be fair to the field manager to have all of the responsibility on 
him, this observation fits in comfortably with the research question that I am trying to 
answer; do organizations that have frequent changes in management see more negative 
results in performance? 
 Kahn (1993) argues that managers must make hundreds of decisions each game, 
most having to do with player performance.  He compares this to other sectors by saying, 
“Managers must also monitor the players’ performance, just as business executives must 
in general monitor the performance of their subordinates” (1993, 532). Kahn’s argument 
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correlates well with the knowledge that decision-making is not an experience that 
focuses on the final moment, but a process of complex decisions made over a period of 
time (Simon 1960). But is there more to the process than just monitoring performance?  
If managing an organization were nothing more than organizational monitoring, 
organizational performance would essentially be random, with managers making 
basically no impact.  Change in performance indicators as a function of managerial 
change would be unlikely. Kahn (1993) points out that successful managers understand 
the strengths and weaknesses of their players, and know how and when to exploit and 
protect them.  Successful managers find ways to control for those strengths and 
weaknesses of their players, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of their opponents.  
For example, in the 2002 World Series, Mike Scioscia, manager of the Angels, chose to 
protect against the strength of Giants slugger Barry Bonds by walking him on nearly half 
of his plate appearances (13 walks and 17 official at-bats).  On the other hand, he chose 
to exploit Bonds’ relatively weak mobility in the outfield by allowing base runners to 
take extra bases when the ball went into left field.  Scioscia, while taking some of the fun 
out of the World Series for Barry Bonds, was making managerial decisions that he felt 
(and consequently turned out to be true) would put his team in the best position to win36 
(This concept is discussed in greater detail in the Runs Created section later in the 
paper.)  This example reiterates the point that managers in baseball have many of the 
same duties and are put into many of the same positions to influence the performance of  
                                                          
36 As it turns out, the Anaheim Angels did win the 2002 World Series by a count of four games to three, in 
one of the most exciting World Series in quite some time. 
  
117
 
their organization as managers in the public sector. 
One reason I felt that it was important to quantitatively test the frequency of 
executive succession and its effects on organizational performance was an observation 
that I made in the initial stages of this project.  I noticed baseball has a fairly static pool 
of managers that teams draw from, and even though a manager gets fired (or released) 
from one team, another team traditionally picks him up.  I looked at the managerial 
history of three managers during the 24-year test period, all of which had the perception 
of being successful and all of which were paid well for their reputation as “great” 
managers (see Figure 5.1).  They are; Lou Piniella, Tony LaRussa, and Joe Torre.  
Piniella and LaRussa each managed three teams during the test period, while Torre 
managed four.  I calculated each team’s winning percentage while the manager was 
there and while he was not.   
The results were surprising.  We find great variation in the winning percentage of 
the teams and managers when we compare the data.  One of the most striking findings is 
that in three of the four cases in which the manager was employed for three years or less, 
their winning percentage was lower than the teams’ aggregate winning percentages.   
Looking at each manager individually, we start with Lou Piniella.  Both the Reds and the 
Mariners increased their performance (winning percentage) significantly under Piniella’s 
tenure, raising the team average from .435 to .538 with the Mariners, while the short 
time he was with the Yankees his percentage was down.  Piniella won the 1990 World 
Series with the Cincinnati Reds.  Torre was essentially a failure until he got to the New 
York Yankees. The Braves, Mets and Cardinals were more successful without him.  
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While with the Yankees, however, he has been wildly successful, winning multiple 
World Series titles and boasting a ridiculously high .602 winning percentage. Tony 
LaRussa’s record was surprising.  The White Sox were better off without him, but just 
barely.  Oakland and St. Louis have benefited greatly from his management. His 1989 
Oakland team won the World Series and his teams finished in first place in the division 
four out of the eight years he managed during the test period.  These findings led me to 
ask if, in the aggregate, managers impact their organization’s performance, particularly 
because of the diversity in performance we see with the teams as the rotated 
management.  
Figure 5.1 
Managerial Tenure 
 
 
 Lou Piniella Without Piniella 
Cincinnati* 1990-1992 = .525 1979-1989, 1993-2003 = 
.503 
New York 
(Yankees) 
1986-1988 = .537 1979-1985, 1989-2003= 
.569 
Seattle 1993-2002 = .538 1979-1992 = .435 
  *World Series 1990 
 
 
 
 
 Tony LaRussa Without LaRussa 
Chicago 
(White Sox) 
1979-1986 = .506 1987-2003 = .510 
Oakland* 1986-1995 = .540 1979-1985, 1996-2003 = 
.503 
St. Louis 1996-2003 = .532 1979-1995 = .514 
  *World Series 1989 
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Figure 5.1 Continued 
 
 Joe Torre Without Torre 
New York Mets 1979-1981 = .399 1982-2003 = .512 
Atlanta 1982-1984 = .529 1979-1981, 1985-2003 = 
.533 
St. Louis 1990-1995 = .478 1979-1989, 1996-2003 = 
.532 
New York Yankees* 1996-2003 = .608 1979-1995 = .532 
  *World Series 1996, 1998-2000 
 
 
Hypotheses 
This chapter will build upon the two previous empirical chapters in an attempt to 
answer the question of frequency and stability.  How do organizations perform when 
they have frequent managerial turnover compared to organizations that have a more 
stable management? This question is best analyzed using the baseball dataset, as it 
provides 24 years and 26 teams that can be studied.   
Again, Boyne and Dahya (2002) argue that changing managers will have an affect on 
the performance of an organization. Thus far, I have articulated in this dissertation that 
the immediate effect will be negative.  We would predict to see, as we saw in chapter IV 
and what we expected to see in chapter V, that managerial succession in baseball 
managers will have a small but significant, negative consequence on performance. 
Furthermore, if organizations continue to replace top managers without allowing for 
some transition period in which all of the previously-articulated relationships can be 
forged and regimes can be adapted, performance is likely to continue to be below 
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predicted values. We predict this is the case for both runs scored and team winning 
percentage. Thus; 
Hypothesis One: Change in baseball managers will affect the performance (runs 
scored) of the team they manage. 
Hypothesis Two: Frequent managerial succession will have significant, negative 
effect on organizational performance. 
Hypothesis Three: Change in baseball managers also affects the winning percentage 
of their team. 
Hypothesis Four:  Frequent managerial succession will have significant, negative 
effects on winning percentage. 
 
Data and Methods 
Finally, this dissertation presents an analysis of Major League Baseball 
managers.  The data sets in the previous two chapters provide a reasonable measure for 
the effects of change, particularly short and long-term, but they do not allow enough 
time to test the “frequency” hypothesis.  Thus, the third data set to be employed here 
includes 26 Major League Baseball teams over a twenty-four year period, 1979-2003. 
Major League Baseball field managers are surprisingly similar to public managers in 
almost all aspects of their jobs.  For example, both public managers and baseball 
managers are charged with producing results that are above the expected norm with the 
resources they have.  Generally speaking, baseball managers have no control over hiring 
and firing of players, or contract negotiations.  Baseball players sign contracts with 
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owners, independent of on-the-field managers.  Civil servants have rights and 
protections that exist regardless of who manages them.  In both baseball and the public 
sector, managers are in part hired and fired by their ability to manage their subordinates 
to successful ends.  In both cases certain managers tend to be more sought after than 
others.  
 
Dependent Variables 
In order to have a data set that is as consistent and comprehensive as possible, I 
used a twenty four-year time period of major league baseball statistics, which ran from 
1979-2003. The manager in this data set is the field manager.  The units of analysis are 
the teams. To test these hypotheses, I employed two distinct dependent variables. 
Baseball provides clear performance indicators; scoring runs and wins. The first deals 
with how each individual on the team performs.  The second deals with how the 
organization or team as a whole performs.  Runs scored is the raw number of runs scored 
by each player on the team, aggregated to the team level. Runs scored over the entire test 
period ranges from 329 by the Toronto Blue Jays in 1981 to 1009 by the Cleveland 
Indians in 1999.  The winning percentage is a percentage of games won of the number of 
games played, and as is standard practice in baseball, is reported in decimal form, and 
ranges from .265 (2003 Detroit Tigers) to .716 (2001 Seattle Mariners).   
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Independent Variables 
The primary independent variables in the baseball data are again, whether or not 
there was a change in management.  The other variable of interest is the frequency with 
which the organization turned over managers.  This variable is an ordinal value from 
three (fewest succession events, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis) to eleven (most 
succession events compliments of the Chicago Cubs).  To test for nonlinear effects I 
squared the frequency variable.  The control variables include individual player and 
manager performance indicators (Player of the Year and Manager of the Year) from both 
leagues and a predictive variable called Runs Created, which controls for the 
individuality of each player on the team by predicting the players’ average career outputs 
and aggregating to the team level.  This allows us to compare the actual performance of 
the team to the predicted performance of the team, arguing that variation in the predicted 
runs scored and actual runs scored can be attributed to the manager, all things being 
equal.  The following is an in depth explanation of each variable. 
  In order to win games, teams must outscore their opponents.  Hitters are not 
responsible for roster changes or calling pitches.  Managers are.  Ultimately hitters are 
responsible for scoring runs.  Bill James (1988) has developed a method for determining 
how much effort a manager ought to be able to get out of his team.  This measure is 
called the “Runs Created” (RC) measure.  Where it is the responsibility of the individual 
player to score runs, this measure comprehensively predicts if a team performs up to the 
level they should, given the players they have.   
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The Runs Created method offers a way to control for the players on the team, and 
the general manager’s influence on salary, contracts, etc.  James’ method controls for 
players that a team has by comparing the players’ total RC to the team’s actual outputs.  
For example, it would hardly be fair to compare the free-spending Los Angeles Dodgers 
of 1988 ($15.2 million combined salaries) to the 1988 Minnesota Twins ($8 million 
combined salaries). However, if each team is compared to itself, we see that the 
difference between the predicted runs for the Dodgers and the actual runs was 38 runs in 
the positive direction, while the Twins under-produced by 26 runs.  Factoring in all of 
the different ways a player can contribute to the scoring of runs is a reflection on how 
effective the manager is in outscoring the opposition, in other words, managing his 
players.   
James’s method considers some of the factors that managers have real control 
over, namely, sacrifice bunts, stolen base attempts, and total at-bats.  The Runs Created 
statistic is: 
RC= (H+BB+HBP-CS-GIDP)*(TB+ (.26(BB-IBB+HBP)) + (.52(SH+SF+SB)))/ 
AB+BB+HBP+SH+SF).     
Where 
H= Hits 
BB= Walks 
HBP= Hit By Pitch 
CS= Caught Stealing 
GDIP= Grounded Into Double Play 
TB= Total Bases 
IBB= Intentional Walks 
SH= Sacrifice Hits 
SF= Sacrifice Fly 
SB= Stolen Base 
AB= At Bat 
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If a player is to be judged on his ability to score runs, it is incomplete to only 
look at batting average and on-base percentages.  The Runs Created formula looks at 
additional aspects of hitting that aid a player’s ability to score runs.  The first term, 
(H+BB+HBP-CS-GIDP), includes the traditional pieces for figuring offensive output, or 
an adjustment to the on-base percentage.  Simply put, the first term factors the number of 
times a player gets on base subtracted from the number of times he gets himself or 
somebody else off.  The second term is where much of the meat of the formula is 
included. The total bases term, (TB+(.26(BB-IBB+HBP)))+(.52(SH+SF+SB)), factors 
other ways that managers can put players on base and position them to score runs.  This 
considers intentional walks as well as sacrifices, in other words, moving runners through 
the bases.  It also includes the standard figure for the league batting average (.260).  The 
total bases term incorporates the slugging percentage into the Runs Created formula. The 
final term, (AB+BB+HBP+SH+SF), is an adjustment to the on-base percentage of the 
hitter.  Presumably, if the manager can get the players to score more runs than they are 
predicted to score, that is, whether the team’s actual runs exceed the calculated RC, then 
the manager has had an impact on the team. Conversely, if actual RC is less than the 
predicted RC, then we can argue that the manager has had a negative influence on 
performance.  They are still affecting performance. 
 The model that I will use to test this hypothesis is: 
 
 
tt MOYMVPMQRCFCMCRS εββββββα +++++++= 6655443322111  
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Where 
 RS = Runs Scored 
 MC = Managerial Change 
 FC = Frequency of Managerial Change  
 MQ = Runs Scored-Runs Created 
 MVP = Most Valuable Player (two/year) 
 MoY = Manager of the Year (two/year) 
 ε  = Error Term 
 β  = Some estimable parameter 
 
Because no such data set exists, I developed my own.  The data are organized 
chronologically by teams, with lagged dependent variables to account for time.  Runs 
Scored is the dependent variable and is analogous to organizational outputs. Teams set 
performance standards that will reflect wins.  Scoring runs is the most obvious and easily 
measurable performance indicator that leads to wins.  Not all teams set the playoffs as 
performance indicators.  If this was the performance standard the industry expected, then 
only 8 of 32 teams per year would have achieved their performance standards.  No, a 
reasonable indicator for the purposes of this test is using the number of runs scored as 
one dependent variable, as we know that you must score more runs than your opponents 
in order to win.  The independent variables are managerial change (MC), frequency of 
managerial change, and the lagged dependent variable associated with the time (see page 
130).  I use an autoregressive model to test the data in order to determine the influence 
of succession on runs scored. 
The second test determined a manager’s impact on the organization by 
incorporating scoring runs and how these runs relate to amassing wins.  A team can be 
expected to win more games if that team can score more runs than it gives up.  Thus, I 
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will use this hypothesis to test a manager’s ability to get his team to outscore the 
opponents.  I measure this concept in the same manner that I test the “Runs” concept.  
Bill James (1988) again provides a formula that tests the concept of predicting a team’s 
winning percentage.  He refers to it as the “Offensive Winning Percentage” or OWP.  
The breakdown is as follows: 
1. Figure runs created per game 
2. Divide that number by the league average (LA) of runs/game 
3. Square the result 
4. Divide that figure by one plus itself 
 
The equation looks like this: 
 
 ((RC/game)/(LA/runs/game))^2/1+((RC/game)/(LA/runs/game))^2 
This equation will give the Offensive Winning Percentage of each team for each year, 
which is a predicted value, similar to the Runs Created value.  This predicted value could 
then be compared against the actual winning percentage of the team to determine if 
producing more runs per game will lead to a better winning percentage.  If the manager 
can get his team to win more games by outscoring their opponents by a wider margin 
than was predicted, then it can be argued that the manager is indeed affecting the 
outcomes of the organization.  
The model is as follows: 
 
tt MOYMVPMQWPFCMCWP εβββββα ++++++= 5543322111 4  
Where 
 WP = Winning Percentage of the Team 
 MC = Managerial Change 
 FC = Frequency of Managerial Change  
 MQWP = Winning Percentage – Offensive Winning Percentage 
 RC = Runs Created 
 ε  = Error Term 
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 β  = Some estimable parameter 
 
Results 
 In testing the first model using time-series data, the relationship between 
performance and managerial succession is unclear. When including a lagged dependent 
variable, in both the runs scored and the winning percentage model, the findings are 
insignificant, mirroring what we saw in the Texas and the British models.  Also, with 
respect to both runs scored and winning percentage, the managerial quality term was 
positive and significant.  This result implies that when controlling for the many factors 
that influence the scoring of runs and winning percentage, managers have the ability to 
influence performance.  This is an important finding in that it establishes the basic logic 
of succession.  If managers did not influence the year-to-year performance of the 
organization, what logic would we see in managerial change affecting performance?    
Interestingly, the test of frequency yielded positive and significant results. This 
was an unexpected result as the theory argues that more succession would lead to lower 
performance. On average, there were nearly seven managerial changes per team during 
the twenty five year test period (mean score of 6.88).  This result seems to contradict the 
hypothesis of frequent change leading to lower performance, both in runs scored and 
winning percentage.  In fact, the implication from the analysis is that organizations with 
more change over longer periods have better performance, after controlling for the down 
year following the change.  This is, indeed, a counter-intuitive empirical result.  The 
explanation seems to lie in the nonlinear relationship between performance and turnover. 
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 I squared the frequency of change value to test in order to test for nonlinearity 
and found the result to be negative and significant in the runs scored model, confirming 
the theoretical expectation of frequent changes, albeit not exactly how the theory was 
laid out.  This result implies a point of diminishing returns.  Some turnover in top 
management will lead to better results, but you can have too much of a good thing.  
After a time, you reach a point of diminishing returns, and the performance of the 
organization begins again to drop.  Interestingly, the result did not hold for the winning 
percentage model as it was negative but insignificant. 
 The results of the Manager of the Year from each league and each league’s Most 
Valuable Player were significant and in the predicted direction. Teams with Managers of 
the Year could generate more runs per season and raise their winning percentage, and 
teams with the Most Valuable Player generate more runs on average as well as raise their 
winning percentage. Only five times out of forty eight awards did the Manager of the 
Year not manage that team the year before.  They were Billy Martin (Oakland, 1980), 
Hal Lanier (Houston, 1986), and Dusty Baker (San Francisco, 1993) and Joe Torre (New 
York Yankees, 1996) and Tony Perez (2003).  Clearly then managers tend to perform 
better when they have developed some stability with their teams, lending support for the 
theory of managerial succession in terms of frequency.37 
  
                                                          
37 However, not all of the variance is predicted by the OWP term.  There may be other factors that were 
not within the scope of this study.  These factors could be, but are not limited to the fact that some games 
are blowouts while others are one-run affairs, and if a particular team loses the one-run games but wins the 
blowouts, it is possible to have a negative MQ score and still have a winning record.  For example the 
1979 Cleveland Indians gave up 51 more runs than they scored yet they still finished a game over .500.  
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Conclusion 
 The findings presented in this chapter mirror the findings in the other two 
chapters relative to short-term managerial change, in that there is no evidence of 
implications on performance in the year following a succession event.  In other words, 
this aspect of the empirical analysis does not support the theory of managerial 
succession.  It is clear that managers make a difference on the actual performance of the 
organization however.  The “runs scored” measure and the “offensive winning 
percentage” measure, when compared together give a very good indication of the value 
of the manager to the team (see Table 5.1). We also see that frequent managerial change 
has a nonlinear relationship with performance.  Organizationally speaking, it can be 
argued, some change is to be desired; however this relationship is not necessarily linear.  
This examination of baseball managers implies that too much change leads to a drop in 
performance, and even the savviest of managers cannot overcome this dilemma.  The 
nonlinear affect of frequent change is evident in this analysis (see Tables 5.2 and 5.3). 
The results suggest that managers do more than simply monitor the work 
behavior of their subordinates.  They have a direct effect on their organization.  Using 
baseball numbers to determine this managerial/organizational relationship allows for 
research in an environment where there are multiple organizations (teams) with the same 
performance indicators (wins and runs). 
 I am implicitly giving the manager credit for the performance of players that 
may come from a player’s personal desire, external motivating factors (salary bonuses, 
trips to the All-Star game, commercial contracts to name a few), or the effects of other 
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coaches (Kahn, 1993).  There is also the concept of “team chemistry” which is extremely 
difficult to measure, but most definitely has some impact on the outcome of the 
organization.38  These same types of concerns exist in the public sector, however, and 
are concerns that public managers are likely to deal with (well, maybe not commercial 
contracts or All-Star games, although non-monetary awards and recognition are an 
important motivating factor for public servants (Hill 2005a)).   
Even though baseball managers are not public managers, they maintain the same 
goal, namely, maximizing their outputs with the resources available.  It seems reasonable 
given the empirical analysis that frequency of managerial change serves to strengthen 
the theory of managerial succession articulated throughout. Managers do affect the 
outcomes of the organization, and we see that managerial succession does indeed, have a 
nonlinear relationship with performance.   
                                                          
38 I tend to agree, however, with Paul DePodesta, general manager for the Los Angeles Dodgers, when he  
said, “chemistry is a three-game win streak” when asked why he traded clubhouse and fan favorite Paul 
LoDuca to the Florida Marlins for Hee Sop Choi, Brad Penny and cash in 2005, which would allegedly 
disrupt the clubhouse chemistry at the time. Chemistry may not be measurable because chemistry may not 
exist.  
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Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics:  Baseball 
 
 
 
Variable        Mean       Min        Max    Std. Dev. 
 
Runs Scored      713.06     329        1009     108.02 
 
Winning Percentage     0.502    0.265      0.716      0.069   
 
Runs Created      714.64     326       1013     109.04 
 
Offensive Winning Percentage   0.499      0.283      0.645      0.059 
 
Managerial Change     0.313         0              1        0.464 
 
Frequent Change     6.88       3              11       2.27 
 
Frequent Change Squared    52.51         9             121     30.44 
 
Managerial Quality (Runs)    -1.58      -83.36     75.22     23.70
     
Managerial Quality (Winning Percentage)  0.0024   -0.180      0.265    0.065 
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Table 5.2 
  Effect of Managerial Succession on Runs Scored and Winning Percentage 
 
 
 
 
 
Runs Scored 
 
Winning Percentage 
 
Lagged Dependent Variable .495** 
(14.15) 
.270** 
(9.98) 
 
  
Managerial Change 2.59 
(0.48) 
.0004 
(0.10) 
 
Frequency of Change 2.35** 
(2.25) 
.0023** 
(3.04) 
 
   
MQ(RS-RC) .440** 
(4.42) 
.733** 
(21.33) 
 
Most Valuable Player 34.08** 
(3.68) 
.033** 
(4.96) 
 
Manager of the Year 43.87** 
(4.73) 
.042** 
(5.88) 
 
Constant 338.47** 
(13.57) 
.342** 
(23.44) 
 
   
Observations 620 620 
R-squared .7350   .6347 
Adjusted R-squared .7220 .6167 
 
 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level
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Table 5.3 
 Effect of Managerial Succession on Runs Scored and Winning Percentage:  
Non-Linear Effects 
 
 
 
 
Runs Scored 
 
 
Winning Percentage 
 
Lagged Dependent Variable .487** 
(13.91) 
.270** 
(9.97) 
 
  
Managerial Change 2.35 
(0.43) 
.0004 
(0.10) 
 
Frequency of Change 15.25** 
(2.50) 
.002** 
(2.07) 
 
Frequency of Change Squared -.976** 
(2.14) 
-9.43e-6 
(0.07) 
 
MQ(RS-RC) .435** 
(4.39) 
.733** 
(21.30) 
 
Most Valuable Player 33.75** 
(3.65) 
.034** 
(4.93) 
 
Manager of the Year 44.45** 
(4.81) 
.041** 
(5.82) 
 
Constant 306.51** 
(10.57) 
.342** 
(23.02) 
 
   
Observations 620 620 
R-squared .7371   .6347 
Adjusted R-squared .7237 .6161 
Note: 
t-scores in parentheses 
* Significant at the .10 level 
** Significant at the .05 level 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I end this dissertation back where it started; addressing the questions posed in the 
introductory chapter.  I asked the following questions as a springboard to the discussion 
of public managerial succession; what effect does changing managers have on 
organizational performance?  What are the potential outcomes of managerial change, 
and do organizations even care?  Are we convinced that managers matter at all, or are 
they merely interchangeable cogs of the organizational wheel, simply monitoring 
subordinates as they perform their standard operating procedures?  I cannot answer 
whether or not organizations care, but as for the other questions, I can draw some 
conclusions. From the theoretical construct and the empirical analysis presented in this 
dissertation, we have come closer to understanding the nature and influence of 
management in public organizations.  In this concluding chapter, I will address the 
questions above, make some concluding remarks relative to the empirical work, and 
draw some normative conclusions based on the empirical results and qualitative research 
employed. 
 
Theoretical Summary 
Organizational performance is a vital attribute of the study of public 
management.  Managers, as the most visible members of the organization, are charged 
with the execution and implementation of laws and statutes passed by the political 
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principals.  The responsibility of overseeing performance (whether it be explicit or 
implicit) rests upon the shoulders of the public manager. Measuring performance in the 
public sector however, is, no doubt, challenging.  In this dissertation, I have presented a 
theory that helps determine not only that managers matter, but that management matters, 
specifically managerial succession.   
Simply stated, the theory posited in this dissertation is that managerial succession 
effects performance in public organizations.  There are multiple facets to the theory that 
make it somewhat more complex, namely, the short-term implications of change, the 
long-term implications of change, the frequency at which managers are turned over, and 
the structure of the organization.  It was impossible to address all of these facets of the 
theory with a single dataset, so I employed multiple datasets; Texas school districts, 
British Education Authorities, and Major League Baseball.  All three of these sources of 
data yielded satisfactory analysis, rich in information for which to test my theory.  Some 
of the results were as hypothesized, some were not.  The following section will 
summarize the empirical analysis and draw concluding remarks based upon the 
empirical tests. 
 
Summary of Empirical Results 
The clearest conclusion that we can draw from this analysis of managerial 
succession is that indeed, in the context of the United States, managerial succession 
influences the performance of organizations. The results from both the Texas school 
district data and the Major League Baseball data suggest that managers do more than 
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simply monitor the work behavior of their subordinates.  They have a direct effect on 
their organization.   The second conclusion that can be drawn is that the first conclusion 
does not seem to stand in all cases. Surprisingly, in the British context, no evidence is 
found to reject the null hypothesis that succession has no relationship with performance.   
 From a short-term perspective, the empirical results from the Texas analysis 
seem to suggest that in the year following a succession event, there is no relationship 
between the change and performance.  However, there is evidence that superintendents 
hired from outside the district have a negative effect on test scores, allowing us to accept 
the insider/outsider hypothesis, at least in the short-term.  The long-term perspective is 
quite different.  In those districts where change occurred, as time progressed, test scores 
improved, or those replacement managers with longer tenure in their new jobs had 
higher student performance.  In addition, the external hire condition lost significance, 
suggesting that in the long run, it’s not so important where the manager comes from as 
long as that manager is given time to remain in the district. When determining the 
impact of change in all of the districts in Texas, we see that there is evidence that 
districts that had a succession event, overall, had better test scores than those that did 
not, suggesting that some innovation or invigoration of ideas or new blood is healthy, or 
at least related to performance. 
 In the baseball chapter, the empirical analysis showed that again, there was no 
evidence of an immediate short term negative effect on scoring runs and winning games.  
Interestingly, there was positive and significant relationship between performance and 
the frequency of change, disallowing us to accept the hypothesis that organizations, at 
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least baseball teams that turn over managers more frequently will have consistently 
lower scores. It seems that the contrary is true; that more managerial turnover leads to 
higher performance.  However, upon further examination there is evidence to suggest 
that the relationship between frequency of succession and negative performance may not 
be linear.  Indeed, when we look at the model in a nonlinear fashion, the relationship 
between frequency and performance emerges, implying that some change may be 
healthy, but too much is related to negative performance. 
 Finally, a discussion of the empirical analysis of managerial succession in the 
UK leads us to the conclusion that there is no evidence to suggest a relationship between 
managerial succession and organizational performance, at least in terms of Local 
Education Authorities and student performance.  Indeed, none of the British models 
presented evidence of a relationship.  The implication here, based on the theoretical 
construction in chapter IV, is that political regimes that structure the bureaucracies as 
ideal-types, or legal-rational, or less inclined to support or indeed see individual 
characteristics of managers influence performance.  At the very least, the empirical tests 
related to the British school authorities do not provide evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of no change in performance.   
 
Some Normative Thoughts Related to Public Management 
Robert Behn argues that good public managers must fulfill eight responsibilities to 
be effective (1997, 3-4).  They are:  
1. Seek to achieve an important public purpose; 
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2. possess a clear definition of success, including benchmarks along the way; 
3. have an overall strategy for achieving their purpose; 
4. be analytical about everything; 
5. pay attention to the details of implementation; 
6. influence people by building coalitions, motivating individuals and teams, and 
creating a favorable climate of public opinion; 
7. recognize and exploit their luck and, when they are not lucky, keep focused on 
the public purpose and grope their way toward it; and 
8. leave the organization better than they found it. 
 
Now, I do not know if Robert Behn’s conception can be tested, or if these nuggets of 
advice are valuable, but Behn’s conception of public management, while being laced 
with normative implications, provides guidance to the practicalities of managing public 
organizations.  His work is valuable in the generation of hypotheses in “best-practices 
research.  However, as Milward (1996) argues, “best-practice” research is not wrong, 
just very narrowly defined and equally narrow in its applicability. From a practical 
perspective, however, best-practice research is likely to be embraced. Admittedly, this 
dissertation is quantitative in nature, but there is a qualitative, normative aspect to public 
management that warrants attention here as well. 
 For example, the Director of the National Baseball Hall of Fame, Dale Petrosky 
recounts a story of Sparky Anderson, the long-time Hall of Fame manager of the 
Cincinnati Reds (Petrosky 2005).  When he asked Pete Rose what made Sparky such a 
great manager, Rose said that he treated his superstars like superstars, and treated 
everyone else the same.  As you know, the Cincinnati teams of the 70’s were loaded 
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with superstars of the magnitude of Pete Rose, Joe Morgan, Johnny Bench, Dave 
Concepcion, Tony Perez, and Ken Griffey, Sr.;39 that’s what made the “Big Red 
Machine” run.  What we learn from this is the very individualistic characteristics that 
accompany management, namely, managerial skill.  In this particular case, Sparky 
Anderson understood the ego and wisdom of his superstars enough to, on occasion, ask 
their opinions and consult with them on certain managerial strategies.  We might even 
call it leadership.  
Petrosky cites two other Hall of Fame managers that are widely considered to be 
“great” managers.  First, he mentions Tommy Lasorda, of the Los Angeles Dodgers.  
Lasorda’s managerial record with the Dodgers (the only team he managed) from 1976-
1996 was 1599-1439 for an average of .526.  He led his team to the National League 
pennant five times, with three World Series victories and was Manager of the Year in 
1983 and 1988.  In his 21 years of managing the Dodgers, he only had a losing record 6 
times.   
Petrosky’s next example of great leadership among managers was Earl Weaver, 
the 18-year manager of the Baltimore Orioles.  Weaver’s career with the Orioles saw a 
winning percentage of .583, with 1480 wins to 1060 losses. Weaver had the ability to see 
potential in players. The most famous example was moving the upstart Cal Ripken, Jr. 
                                                          
39 Those on this list that are in the National Baseball Hall of Fame are Joe Morgan, Johnny Bench, and 
Tony Perez.  Pete Rose, arguably the most celebrated member of the “Big Red Machine” holds 17 Major 
League and National League records, among them are the all-time hits record of 4256, most at-bats 
(14053), and holds the national record for longest hitting streak at 44 games (Major League hit streak is 61 
games by Joe DiMaggio).  Rose, however, is not in the Hall of Fame because he admitted that he bet on 
baseball while managing the Reds in the 80’s, which led to a lifetime ban from baseball. 
  
140
 
from 3rd base to shortstop.40  Ripken was exclusively a 3rd baseman in his minor league 
playing days, but the move to short stop proved to be the right one, as Ripken went on to 
play 2632 consecutives games, eclipsing Lou Gehrig’s seemingly unbeatable streak of 
2130 in the 1920’s and 30’s. Ripken earned two Gold Gloves for fielding excellence and 
was the American League MVP twice and named to baseball’s All-Century team in 
1999. Weaver’s Orioles won the World Series in 1970 and finished over .500 in every 
season but one. Are all of Ripken’s accomplishments the product of Earl Weaver’s 
decision to move him to shortstop?  Probably not. Is all of the success of the Orioles a 
product of Weaver’s managerial skill? Probably not. But his ability to recognize 
potential is one anecdotal trait which made Weaver great, according to Petrosky.   
Petrosky’s reference to these three Hall of Fame managers as great managers all 
accumulate to three things.  They are motivators, they have enthusiasm related to their 
jobs, and they see and understand potential.  Since these managers have left their teams, 
only the Reds have returned to win a World Series.  
What does this discussion of three baseball managers have to do with public 
managers?  Public management is about understanding and overseeing people. Kettl and 
Milward (1996, 1) say, “Public management matters, and it matters because the quality 
of public management shapes the performance of public organizations.”  Wilson 
                                                          
40 Traditionally, shortstops had been small, fleet of foot athletes with exceptional fielding abilities but were 
liabilities at the plate, unable to hit for any power due to their miniscule size.  Ripken, at 6’4” and over 200 
pounds was a departure from the mold. Most of Weaver’s contemporaries raised their eyebrows at such a 
move, but history has proven that the Ripken mold of shortstop is permeating the profession, as Alex 
Rodriguez of the New York Yankees, Miguel Tejada of the Baltimore Orioles, Derek Jeter of the Yankees, 
and Nomar Garciaparra when he was with the Red Sox stand as testimony.  These are the highest paid 
shortstops, averaging over $16 million/year versus the other shortstops in the league that average roughly 
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provided us with its foundation. Gulick provided us the original framework for 
managing people.  Lynn and his colleagues have attempted to put into a global 
perspective.  Even as we attempt to theoretically and empirically strengthen our 
understanding of public management, we are cognizant that management comes back to 
managing people. Whether it’s moving Ripken from third to shortstop, or a new 
superintendent in Longview, Texas hiring a new vice principal to better enforce 
discipline, public management scholarship is concerned, at the normative level, with 
individualism.  
 
Potential for Future Research 
The field of public management has been studied primarily in the context of hierarchy, 
but the reality is that a great deal of management occurs outside of the hierarchical 
structure in the environment (O’Toole 2000).  This increased variability in managerial 
efforts requires more inclusive techniques in theorizing about public management and 
testing empirically falsifiable hypotheses.  Part of this inclusiveness is strengthening the 
understanding of the role of structural context.  I have attempted to present an analysis in 
this direction, but there is a tremendous amount of data that has yet to be collected and 
more theoretical discussion to be generated.  In addition, international corroboration will 
also help build theory in public management.  This is underway, to some extent, but as 
                                                                                                                                                                           
$2 million/year (baseball-reference.com, 2006), however they are by no means overtaking the traditional 
miniscule shortstop. 
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technology improves so does our ability to communicate with scholars with experiences 
in public management far different from our own.   
 Recall in the theoretical chapter of this dissertation I referenced three scenarios 
which could explain why organizations make the hiring decisions they do. They were: 
political factors, which is that organizations may choose a short-term candidate over a 
long-term candidate because political pressures demand immediate change in 
performance. Second, bureaucratic factors, which is that organizations may desire to 
redesign the long-term goals and direction of the organization and are willing to sacrifice 
short-term performance to reach there long-term goals.  Third is reflective speculation, 
which is that the organization asks the following question—how were we doing vs. what 
are our options for replacement? This dissertation has only approached this discussion in 
terms of noting its importance, but an exploration and analysis of the three scenarios will 
likely provide a more complete understanding of how the managerial/organizational 
relationship operates. 
A fourth avenue of future research in managerial succession is pushing the 
application of the theory to venues other than school districts, as the context surrounding 
school districts differs from other public bureaucracies.  These four avenues of future 
research will likely bring us closer to really understanding the role of managerial 
succession in public organizations. 
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 Final Thoughts 
While I have attempted to create some generalizable results from the quantifiable 
evidence and empirical analysis presented in this dissertation, it is just as likely that 
“untestable” functions that Behn and other “best practice” advocates adhere to, like 
leadership and personal attributes, contribute to managerial skill, compounding the very 
real influence of managerial succession on organizational performance.  Even with its 
shortcomings, I hope the analysis in this dissertation will contribute to the future of 
public management scholarship and debate.   
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